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BEFORE THE BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE REQUEST FOR AGENCY ACTION OF UTAH CHAPTER OF THE SIERRA CLUB, SOUTHERN UTAH WILDERNESS ALLIANCE, NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, AND NATIONAL PARKS CONSERVATION ASSOCIATION, PETITIONERS; DIVISION OF OIL, GAS AND MINING, RESPONDENT REQUEST FOR BOARD REVIEW OF THE DIVISION'S OCTOBER 19, 2009, APPROVAL OF THE APPLICATION OF ALTON COAL DEVELOPMENT, LLC, TO CONDUCT SURFACE COAL MINING AND RECLAMATION OPERATIONS IN COAL HOLLOW, KANE COUNTY, UTAH.

DOCKET NO. 2009-019 CAUSE NO. C/025/0005

TAKEN AT: Department of Natural Resources 1594 West North Temple, Room 1040

Salt Lake City, Utah

DATE: Wednesday, January 27, 2010

TIME: 10:20 A.M. TO 3:13 P.M.

REPORTED BY: Michelle Mallonee, RPR

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1 Docket No. 2009-019 Cause No. C/025/0005 2 Wednesday, January 27, 2010 (The proceedings began at 10:20 a.m.) 3 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Good morning. We will resume 4 our hearing this morning. This is Docket No. 2009-019 5 Cause No. C/025/0005. It's in the matter of the Request 6 for Agency Action of Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club, 7 Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, Natural Resources 8 Defense Council, and National Parks Conservation 9 Association, Petitioners; Division of Oil, Gas and 10 Mining, Respondent Request for Board Review of the 11 Division's October 19, 2009, approval of the Application 12 of Alton Coal Development, LLC, to Conduct Surface Coal 13 Mining and Reclamation Operations in Coal Hollow, Kane 14 15 County, Utah. 16 Mr. Morris, are you are representing the 17 petitioner? MR. MORRIS: I am, along with -- if I may 18 introduce --19 20 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Yes, please. MR. MORRIS: Sharon Buccino, Steve Bloch, and 21 22 Tiffany Bartz. CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Good morning. 23 Mr. Alder, you're representing the State? 24 MR. ALDER: Yes, Mr. Chairman. And Mr. Fred 25

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Donaldson is also representing the State. He'll be arguing this morning.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Good morning.

Mr. Bayer, you are representing the respondent?

MR. BAYER: Yes, sir -- good morning -- I am.

Also with me, of course, is James Allen.

Denise Dragoo has just received notification that she has to go home. Her father suffered a serious coronary. She's leaving for Phoenix. But she is of record. She was going to be making some arguments this morning on some of the issues. We're going to have to do some adjustment regarding that, since she now needs to leave precipitously.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Okay.

And Mr. Bernard, you are representing intervenor Kane County?

MR. BERNARD: That's correct.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Good morning to you.

MR. BERNARD: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: This morning we're going to be hearing several motions which have been entered by the various parties. We will start off this morning with the petitioners' request for a hearing examiner.

So Mr. Morris, if you would like to proceed, please.

MR. MORRIS: Yes, sir. May it please the Board, thanks for the opportunity to address our motion for a hearing examiner.

To us, the appointment of a hearing examiner is a good idea. It will, in our estimation, enable this proceeding to reach a conclusion far more quickly and expeditiously than if the rest of the proceedings are tried out before the full Board. And it will relieve the full -- members of the full Board of the need to spend a great deal additional time on this particular proceeding than if there is not a hearing examiner.

Having said that, we recognize that the appointment of a hearing examiner is completely within this Board's discretion. We think it's a good idea, which we hope the Board will adopt. But if the Board does not believe that it is the best way to proceed, we are perfectly happy to present our case to the full Board.

And having said that, we ask that you seriously consider and grant the motion for a hearing examiner.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Thank you, Mr. Morris.

Mr. Alder.

 $$\operatorname{MR.\ ALDER}:$$ Yes. I'd like to briefly address that question.

It has been suggested that it would not be

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appropriate to have a hearing examiner in this matter, that it's different than the Oil and Gas matters. And I just refer the to Board to 4010 -- this is the Utah Coal Act -- Section 6.7. And it refers to matters being heard before the Board pursuant to its rules. And in the rules at 645-300-212.300, those rules specifically refer to the 641 procedural rules. And as you are aware, the procedural rules at 641.13 provide for a hearing examiner. So we think it's appropriate, or at least it's certainly not inappropriate; it can be done. Whether it's appropriate or not is really a question for the members of the Board.

There are a couple of stipulations that have been suggested by the petitioner, which I assume were part of his motion. They were in the written materials. One would be that under the rules, there's an opportunity for a de novo hearing before the Board. And my understanding is that if there was a hearing examiner, the hearing examiner would enter findings. And again, there is some discretion within the rule for whether it's just factual findings or complete findings and conclusions that are reviewed, then, by the Board as a whole. My understanding is that those would be subject to question within the record. But there would not -- so it would be like an appellate-type of argument before the

Board. If any party wanted to object to those findings made by the hearing examiner, there would not be a de novo proceeding.

I think the second thing that was part of the motion -- although, again, I'm sure we would all defer to you -- but the assumption would be that since sometimes in appointing a hearing examiner, the difficulty is finding a hearing examiner. It was, I believe, thought that -- at least none of the parties would object to one of the Board members serving as a hearing examiner. And that might facilitate the choice.

Having said that, it's certainly not only within your discretion, it is the most personal type of decision for the Board to make. So we would defer to whatever your pleasures are, but with the understanding that you would have that right.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Thank you, Mr. Alder.

Mr. Bayer.

MR. BAYER: We take a little bit different posture, and of course we set it out in our response.

I don't really believe that under the rules, as it relates to coal, that the Board is allowed to have a hearing examiner. Under 4010.3, the definition of "adjudicative proceeding" specifically says, "a Division or Board action," and it speaks about the Board.

Whereas, in other provisions of Utah law, where it would allow a hearing examiner, we don't believe that that's been incorporated within the provisions for a coal permit.

Specifically, what concerns me the most is the de novo proceeding. If, in fact, we are required to have a hearing in front of a hearing examiner, and then there's the possibility of a de novo hearing before this Board, it seems a ridiculous waste of effort, and energy, time, and money to essentially have the same hearing twice.

My position is, is that I trust this Board to be able to make an informed intellectual decision over the matters that are presented to it. But I know that from my experience that it's much easier for you to be able to weigh the evidence as it's presented to you firsthand, rather than it is for you to have to look at a dry transcript to try to make a decision as to whether to affirm or deny a lower decision. So I think that we're much better suited to have this Board hear the testimony that is related directly to the merits involved within the petitioner's Request for Relief rather than us having to deal with two different de novo hearings.

Secondly, if we are correct that the Utah law does not contemplate and incorporate the provisions for

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allowing a hearing examiner, then the question becomes whether or not we have had a valid administrative proceeding. If we have not had a valid administrative proceeding, then the party that, perhaps, does not get the relief or order that it desires, it conjures up all sorts of nightmare circumstances as to what would be the actual judicial review. And whether or not the hearing examiner is, in fact, allowed -- if the hearing examiner has not been allowed and that issue is raised within judicial review, then we've had no proceeding, whatsoever. And then the question is whether or not there was an exhaustion of administrative remedies, and whether or not we actually have any record that is an official record to be reviewed with a judicial review.

If, in fact, it is not allowed, then for those of us who are practitioners of law, that is akin to trying to waive subject matter jurisdiction. You cannot agree to waive rules and implement a framework for a hearing that is not allowed by statute.

Therefore, we take the position that a hearing examiner is not allowed under the Utah rules, and that we ask that the Board go ahead and act as the adjudicatory body on this as provided for in the regulations.

And I'll tell you this, that for those of you that are concerned about the lengthy number of topics

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that are on this morning's docket, we have already taken tremendous steps to narrow that. We are going to be presenting to you very, very few items this morning. I think good practitioners are able to do that. And it is my hope that we're able to facilitate this Board and be able to expedite matters on our own, so we are not tied down in the extent that they would otherwise think that a hearing examiner would help expedite it. So I think we can actually narrow the focus, get this put into a posture where it will be easier for this Board to make the examination.

I prefer that this Board be the examining body, for the reasons I've stated.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Thank you, Mr. Bayer.

Mr. Bernard.

MR. BERNARD: Kane County supports Mr. Bayer's position, and would like to point out that not only are there problematic issues in the event a hearing officer were appointed as to subject matter jurisdiction, but as to due process and equal protection issues, which would affect Kane County and all of -- the entire process. So our -- Kane County's view is that in order to find a safe harbor for both the Board and the parties, so everything's been properly adjudicated, the Board itself should hear the matter.

[12] 1 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Thank you, Mr. Bernard. Mr. Morris, is there anything else you would 2 like to say on the matter? 3 MR. MORRIS: Only very briefly to say that 4 Mr. Alder's presumptions about the petitioner's position 5 regarding de novo review are correct, and that we do not 6 believe that a de novo review by the Board of a hearing 7 8 examiner's recommendations, findings, or proposed findings, would be appropriate. We're prepared to take 9 any measure that the Board would deem reasonable to take 10 that off the table. 11 Other than that, we believe, again, that it's a 12 good idea and commend it to the Board for consideration. 13 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Thank you. 14 15 Mr. Alder, anything else? MR. ALDER: Nothing further. 16 17 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Mr. Bayer? MR. BAYER: I think I've already stated it. The 18 only thing I'm convinced is that we cannot waive that 19 issue; and therefore, we have to have the Board. 20 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Mr. Bernard. 21 22 MR. BERNARD: Nothing further, other than Mr. Morris' position makes it clear that there will be 23 24 subject matter jurisdiction issues in the event the Board

did not hear the evidence.

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1 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Would the Board like to take 2 any action at this time, or do you want to deliberate on this during a break today? What's the pleasure of the 3 Board? 4 MR. JENSEN: Mr. Chairman, I would first like to 5 make an observation and then a motion. 6 7 I've listened to the arguments. I believe that 8 the Board does have the authority to appointment a hearing examiner. Having said that, however, I, for one, 9 as a Board member, want to hear this case. And I 10 therefore move that the motion for appointment of a 11 hearing examiner be denied. 12 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Is there a second? 13 MR. HAROUNY: I'll second it. 14 15 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Seconded by Mr. Harouny. Any discussion? 16 Okay. All those in favor say "aye." 17 BOARD MEMBERS: Aye. 18 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Anyone opposed? 19 Okay. So we'll deny that request for the 20 hearing examiner. 21 22 MR. MORRIS: Thank you for your consideration. CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Thank you, Mr. Morris. 23 24 The second motion we have this morning is also from the petitioner, and it deals with request for 25

discovery.

Mr. Morris, would you like to address that?

MR. MORRIS: Yes. We have, in discussions
before the hearing, reached a tentative agreement on a
stipulation of discovery. And pending our drafting that
stipulation and signing it, we would propose to defer
argument. And if we reach this stipulation, we'll
withdraw the motion.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Okay. So you're deferring that until later today, I'm assuming. Is that what you meant?

MR. MORRIS: If we can draft the stipulation today, yes. If not, we have an agreement regarding -- we think we have an agreement regarding discovery. And so what we are asking for is the leave of the Board to either draft that stipulation today if possible, or if not possible, to leave the matter open until we are able to draft the stipulation and sign it. At the time that we have a signed stipulation, we'll withdraw the motion.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Okay. Very good.

And that's the general understanding of all the parties of where we're heading on that issue. Is that correct, at this time?

MR. ALLEN: Yes, Mr. Chairman.

MR. BERNARD: It is, except Kane County is not a

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party to any discovery issues; so therefore, we don't believe we have a place at the table for that purpose.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Thank you.

Mr. Alder, that's your understanding?

MR. ALDER: Yes. And I think that it's probably a little less tentative than it may sound. I think the parties have discussed this, as you know, for some length, that we have a pretty firm understanding that discovery will be allowed under certain conditions, including, I think, the motion with regard to a site visit. And so I just advise the Board that we join -- we are grateful and think it's a good move by everybody to move this thing forward, and I think it will be completed.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Okay, thank you.

MR. JENSEN: Mr. Chairman?

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Yes.

MR. JENSEN: Would it be appropriate, or maybe the parties contemplate, but that the stipulation also have an accompanying proposed order so that we don't have to have an issue about whether the order meets the -- what the parties intended in the stipulation? Would that be okay?

MR. ALDER: That would be a good idea.

MR. MORRIS: Certainly agreeable to the

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petitioners.

MR. BAYER: I think that's appropriate.

And if I might add, I didn't know that you weren't going to want us to discuss it prior to Mr. Alder, so that was why I was sitting here silently.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Oh, I'm sorry. Got the batting order out of line.

MR. BAYER: You had me confused.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Okay.

MR. BAYER: Just to the extent that I agree with Mr. Alder, I think it's not as nearly as tentative as it might sound. I think we've come to some very concrete terms. I would ask that the parties, today, hammer out the stipulation, present it to you immediately, and then we do not adjourn today without a stipulation. Even if we need to have it dictated into the record. I would prefer to do that so that everybody leaving here today is on the same playing field.

MR. MORRIS: We're agreeable to that.

MR. ALDER: Yes.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: I think the Board is, also. Just ask the parties to bear in mind that it will be a joint motion, and then it's up to the Board to decide whether or not to accept that motion.

MR. BAYER: Correct.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Okay. Then let's move forward to the third request.

That's a request by the Division -- motion by the Division for a partial dismissal. And I believe that the request for partial dismissal overlaps in several areas with the request by the respondent's, Alton Coal Development, motion for partial summary judgment. And I believe we're going to be discussing those items jointly. Is that correct?

MR. ALDER: Yes.

MR. BAYER: Well, let me state that the only problem I have with that, right now, is the sudden disappearance of Ms. Dragoo, who was going to be addressing those issues on behalf of Alton. We would like, if possible, that prior to the time that we get into the actual discussion of those issues, that we have a few minutes so that we might regroup and figure out exactly the manner in which we're going to present those issues.

There are some other issues that I think that we can take that are preliminary, even to those discussions on the motions to dismiss, that might well be worthwhile, and then we can get those out of the way, as well.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Okay. I believe the parties have been able to pare down what we're going to be doing

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today significantly

MR. BAYER: If I may speak, Mr. Chairman.

There's actually been two sets of motions to dismiss.

There's a hydrologic set and non hydrologic set. The parties have agreed that as far as the hydrologic set, we're going to pass those for today's purposes. For a variety of reasons, we think it's probably better than to belabor the Board with that material today. We would like to pass that until a later date.

There was an objection filed by the petitioners to the manner of whether or not this Board had the right to conduct a summary judgment examination. So we have, I think, amongst ourselves agreed that rather than style the summary judgment, whatever it might be, that the motions to dismiss will be considered as motions to dismiss rather than a summary judgment issue. And we've agreed to style our motions as motions to dismiss rather than motions for summary judgment. So we will join in with the Division on the standard of it being a motion to dismiss. And that obviates a whole inquiry as to whether or not there could be a summary disposition or a summary judgment. We don't have to worry about that debate today.

And so to that extent, I think we have basically eliminated today's entire docket, but for the discussion

of the non hydrologic issues, if I am correct.

MR. ALDER: Yes. If I might just, since it's our motion. As I understand it, we did join in the one hydrologic issue that was separately briefed, and that, we understand, will not be heard. So we'll just be arguing the non hydrologic portion of the motion to dismiss.

MR. BAYER: And I'm not speaking for Kane
County, but I believe that they're not going to want to
discuss their motions today, either.

MR. BERNARD: That's correct. And the reason for Kane County is, I have not yet seen the response from the petitioners. I believe Mr. Morris was kind enough to, in a sense, stipulate. He said that he would not debate that on behalf of petitioners, as far as continuing the matter -- the hearing in the matter until another date.

MR. MORRIS: That's correct.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: We appreciate the efforts of the parties in agreeing and trying to pare down these proceedings.

But I just do want to remind all the parties that it is the decision of the Board as to whether or not these things will be heard today or not.

MR. MORRIS: Understood.

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CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Mr. Alder, then, I think we're to you.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.\ \operatorname{ALDER}:$\ \operatorname{Yes}.$\ \operatorname{Mr}.$$ Donaldson will be arguing our motion.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Mr. Donaldson, good morning. Please go ahead.

MR. DONALDSON: Good morning, Members of the Board. Fred Donaldson representing the Division. I'll try to keep my discussion brief. I know we have a lot of ground to cover. We've already covered a lot of ground. And I'll do my best to answer any questions you may have along the way.

As Mr. Alder pointed out, and as counsel has agreed, today we're only looking at discussion of the non hydrologic issues. The Division has filed a motion to dismiss some of the insubstantial claims that require no factual development.

The Board can dismiss claims in the Request for Agency Action where no relief can be granted. In other words, the Board is empowered to dismiss a claim in a situation where, even if the factual allegation is true, there is no available relief; for example, the petitioner's claim that the Division did not consider the Panguitch Historic District in its analysis of cultural and historic resources. The Board can dismiss this

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claim, even if it is true that the Division did not consider the impacts of mining operations on the Panguitch Historic District, since the Division was not required by law to consider those impacts.

The Board does not have authority to provide relief for that claim since the law doesn't provide relief for that factual allegation. In other words, the claim can be dismissed because the allegation, even if true, does not state a valid legal claim within the purview of the Coal Act or the applicable regulations.

The Board should dismiss the insubstantial claims in order to focus the hearing on the other claims.

I'll now discuss why the Board should dismiss the claims related to cultural and historic resources, air quality, and wildlife.

In a motion to dismiss, the Board should look at the four corners of the Request for Agency Action and decide whether each claim states a valid factual allegation with relief at law. The parties don't disagree that the Board can dismiss claims for failing to state a proper claim. The Board should dismiss the claim that the Panguitch National Historic District should have been analyzed. The Division complied with the applicable laws and regulations.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Do you have a slide

presentation? Is that what you're doing?

MR. DONALDSON: Yeah, we just have a little bit of administrative rules.

The Division was not required to consider the effects of the coal mining operations on the Panguitch National Historic District because the Division is only required to consider cultural and historic resources -- effects on cultural and historic resources that are within the permit area or adjacent area. And the Panguitch National Historic District is not within the adjacent area.

This is Rule 411 -- 645 -- I left out 301.

Excuse me. This is Rule 645-301-411.140. It says, "The application will contain maps as described" --

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: 141?

MR. DONALDSON: I'm sorry.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Oh, it's 140. Excuse me.

MR. DONALDSON: It's 140. So "The application will contain maps as described under Rule 645-301-411.141 and a supporting narrative which describes the nature of cultural and historic resources listed or eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places and known archeological sites within the permit and adjacent areas." And then it goes on to talk about where that description will be coming from.

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So it becomes clear from the reading of this rule that the Board -- or that the Division is only required to consider impacts on cultural and historic resources that are located within the permit area and adjacent areas. The Panguitch District is located 30 miles from the permit area, so that's not even in question.

Now the question is whether the Panguitch
National Historic District should be considered within
the adjacent area for cultural resources. And the Rule
states, again, that "adjacent area" means, "The area
outside the permit area where a resource or resources,
determined according to the context in which adjacent
area is used, are or reasonably could be expected to be
adversely impacted by proposed coal mining and
reclamation operations, including probable impacts from
underground workings." This is directly from the
regulations. It's the definition of "adjacent area."

The Division has determined, or rather the Division did not include the Panguitch National Historic District within its analysis, because it did not determine that the Panguitch District was within the adjacent area.

As it says in the statute, it says that the adjacent area is an area determined, according to the

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context in which adjacent area is used, where impacts could reasonably be expected to be felt.

Now, it isn't reasonable to expect impacts from the coal mining operations based on the context of the Panguitch National Historic District. The primary coal haul route is Highway 89, US Highway 89. And as the Board saw from the Division's motion, it should have received a map of that. And I'm sorry, I don't have the map of that with me. But Highway 89 runs through the Panguitch National Historic District -- again, which is located 30 miles from the mining site.

Now, it's been argued that, or it seems to be argued that the Division is required to consider all impacts -- all possible impacts on anything that might have any relationship to coal, even the coal haulage.

Now, the question is whether in the context the impacts could be reasonably expected -- or adverse impacts could be reasonably expected. Because Highway 89 is a heavily used transportation route, the Division did not include -- did not believe that cultural and historic resources along Highway 89 would be -- it was reasonable to believe that they would be adversely affected. Excuse me as I'm trying to articulate this.

But the Division made a determination that, based on the context of the resource, that Highway 89 --

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being heavily used -- no, there was no reasonable expectation of adverse impacts on the Panguitch National Historic District. Therefore, since it was not in -- therefore, it's not within the adjacent area.

The language referring to -- you may have seen in the briefs the language referring to "affected area." "Affected area" also has a particular definition in the Code rules. The only relevant question, however, in this discussion, is whether the district is located within the adjacent area. The Division did not find that it was located within the adjacent area. It's a legal determination. The Board -- the Division made this determination; and it's purely a legal question that requires no factual development.

Moving on to air quality -- unless there are questions with regard to this issue.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Go ahead and move on, Mr. Donaldson.

MR. DONALDSON: The Division and ACD, the operator, the permit applicant, have complied fully with the requirements of the Coal Act with regard to air quality permitting. Here are the applicable regulations related to what is required for -- in terms of air quality -- air pollution control. It says, "For all surface coal mining and reclamation activities with

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projected production rates exceeding 1 million tons of coal per year, the application will contain an air pollution control plan, which includes the following: An air quality monitoring program to provide sufficient data to evaluate the effectiveness of the fugitive dust control practices proposed under Rule 645-301-423.200 to comply with Federal and Utah air quality standards and a plan for fugitive dust control practices as required under the other two rules."

Now, the language that I want to emphasize is underlined and in bold. There is no question that the permit contains a fugitive dust control plan as required by the rule. The question is whether -- or the petitioners have attacked the sufficiency of the plan. The appropriate place to -- however, to attack that plan, whether it complies with Federal and Utah air quality standards, is before the Utah Department of Air Quality. Now, the fugitive dust control plan has been submitted to the Utah Department of Air Quality for evaluation for compliance with air quality standards. And if DAQ's experts find that the plan, including the use of EPA Method 9, is adequate, the Division isn't going to second-guess their determination. They are the air quality experts in the state. And the plan that has been presented just needs to comply with Federal and Utah air

quality standards. They make that determination.

Now, if petitioners disagree with the determination of the Division of Air Quality, they can appeal that determination before the Air Quality Board. It's not for this Board to decide whether the air pollution -- or the fugitive dust control plan complies with Federal and Utah air quality standards. That is up to the Division of Air Quality. And they are reviewing the plan and will have to sign off on the final plan.

The "nice guy" issue should also be dismissed.

There's simply no law requiring the Division to consider impacts on the clarity of the nice guy, as seen from Bryce Canyon or the Dixie National Forest. The interaction between the Federal process and the State process at one time led to a deficiency in a technical analysis that has since been withdrawn.

Now, the federal NEPA process may be required to consider nice guy issues in Bryce Canyon and Dixie National Forest. But there is no state requirement to consider those. You are looking at the requirement within the law for what's required.

They make a citation -- one of the citations was -- it says, at the very bottom, "A plan for fugitive dust control" -- excuse me -- "practices as required under 645-301-244.100." And this is that statute. It

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says, "All exposed surface areas will be protected and stabilized to effectively control erosion and air pollution attendant to erosion." And this has been done. This basically is what is addressed in the fugitive dust control plan that has been submitted to the Utah Department of Air Quality. Even with the factual allegations they've made regarding air quality, there's simply no legal relief that can be granted for this claim; and it should be dismissed.

Now, moving into the wildlife protection. In the Request for Agency Action, the petitioners basically made two claims. First they say, "The Department of" -- excuse me. "The Division of Wildlife Resources has not approved the wildlife protection plan that was proposed by Alton Coal Development. And second, that the application doesn't contain a specification of measures that ACD will take to monitor or limit roadkill. Neither of these is required by law." Okay.

What's required by law is that the permit application include, as located -- as found here in Rule 645-301-330, "Each application will contain a plan for protection of vegetation, fish, and wildlife resources throughout the life of the mine." And second, "Each application will include fish and wildlife resource information for the permit area and adjacent areas."

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There is a wildlife protection plan located within the permit application. Therefore, they have complied with the provision -- with both provisions. And they are not required to have a roadkill protection plan. Even though they're not required to have that plan, they actually do address roadkill issues, and those citations to those -- to the fact that they address those are located in their brief and also in our brief.

Now, an important point to make here is that there is no legal requirement that the plan either, one, address roadkill, or two, the Division of Wildlife Resources approve the plan. There is a provision in the statute -- and I'm sorry I don't have that -- I don't have that regulation with me -- but there is a provision that says that the Division will consult with the Division of Wildlife Resources. And they have done that, and there has been no allegation that they haven't done that.

Wildlife Resources is not required to approve any plan or anything that the Division has done. And therefore, for these reasons we ask that this claim also be dismissed.

Oh, the rule is Rule 322 -- excuse me, 645-301-322.100. It states, "The scope and level of detail for such information" -- information contained in

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322, which you're looking at right here, fish and wildlife resource information -- "will be determined by the Division in consultation with state and federal agencies with responsibilities for fish and wildlife and will be sufficient to design the protection enhancement plan required" by additional regulation. So basically it says the scope and level of detail is determined by the Division in consultation with the state agency. There's nothing about approval in this regulation.

Members of the Board, the Board should dismiss the claims identified by the Division in order to focus the hearing on the other claims. These claims, as laid out, are legally deficient and can be decided without any factual development. The Board should dismiss the claim that the Division was required to analyze the impacts of mining on the Panguitch Historic District because the Panguitch Historic District is not located within the adjacent area for cultural and historic resources.

Second, the Board should dismiss the air quality claims because the Division and ACD have adopted a fugitive dust control plan as required by rule and in consultation with Division of Air Quality, and because Division of Air Quality will sign off on that prior to any air quality permits being issued, and because there's no law requiring the analysis of the clarity of the night

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And third, the Board should dismiss the claims about sage grouse and wildlife protection because the Division is not required to obtain approval from the Division of Wildlife Resources, and because no roadkill plan is legally required.

Even if the factual allegations in petitioner's claims are true, the Board should dismiss these claims because the law does not provide relief for those allegations. The Division respectfully requests the Board grant its motion to dismiss. That's all I have.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Thank you, Mr. Donaldson.

Does the Board have any specific questions for Mr. Donaldson at this time? Okay.

I believe we're moving to you, Mr. Bayer.

MR. BAYER: I guess we're up then, huh? CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Yes, sir.

MR. BERNARD: All right. I think that the

Division has framed the issues exceptionally well,

candidly. But I think one of the things that this Board

21 needs to keep in mind, which is of most critical

22 importance, is the multi-faceted aspect of what is the

Board's function in regard to the permit.

The Board has already determined that it will

defer to the Division's technical expertise. Do not lose

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site of that, because if we're dealing with something that's based upon the technical expertise of the Division, then you've already made the decision that you're going to defer to that technical expertise.

Secondly, a permit challenge is not based upon a concept of what would somebody else do if they were the decision maker, for making the decision on whether or not the permit should or should not be issued. So in other words, if a petitioner, somebody is protesting the issuance of a surface coal mining permit, it's not whether or not they would have issued the permit; it's not whether or not they would have required more; it's not whether or not they feel that the permit application package is insufficient. The standard is whether or not the rules and regulations by which every permit applicant is bound to follow has satisfied the requirements of the permit application process.

So while the petitioners might say, We wish there would be more information; we would like to see this in there; we don't think that this was addressed; that's not the inquiry. The inquiry is whether or not Alton is required to produce that material.

If we look at these issues that have been presented by the Division, and if you analyze them in the same fashion as -- which the Division has reviewed and in

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the same fashion which Alton has presented, there is no -- for those of us who are practitioners, there is no genuine issue of material fact. In other words, it doesn't make any difference whether or not there would be discovery that could be had on these matters. It will make no difference.

If, in fact, Alton has not presented a wildlife plan other than that which is in the record, then that's correct. What is in the record is in the record. If that is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the rules and regulations related to a permit application, then it's sufficient. This Board will have the opportunity to look at the regulations, look at what is in the permit application package, and then make a decision as to whether or not it is or is not sufficient.

We maintain that all of the provisions that are required are complete and they meet the rules and regulations. So if, in fact, there is any argument presented by the petitioners that these topics are not ripe for discussion because there is discovery that is required to be had upon these topics, I think the Division has framed this perfectly correct; and that is, as a matter of law, it makes no difference what facts could be developed, might be developed at a later date, because this is not a factual issue.

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If you look at the circumstances as it relates to Panguitch -- and we'll take the issues of Panguitch first. If the petitioners are correct in their assumption that there must be something more in the permit application regarding the effects upon the community of Panguitch, then basically what they are telling to the Board, without coming out and telling this Board that, Panguitch must then be included within the permit. And if you start taking a position as a Board that Panguitch must be included within the permit application package, then what you're doing is, you're setting a standard that is unlimited in scope, unlimited in boundary as to what then becomes part of a permit.

If I must do something beyond that which is already included within the permit, then there becomes an issue as: Do I then have to bond Panguitch? Do I then have to go in and reclaim Panguitch? What is it that I have to do? And this tends to exacerbate the whole review process by the Division, because the definitions of the areas that I must include within a permit, whether it be an affected area, I've got to have that for all practical purposes in my permit area. If it's an adjacent area, while it's not in my permit, an adjacent area has never, as far as I can determine, been considered to include a public area that is 30-some-odd

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miles away.

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The requirements that are set out as far as what Alton must show, and as the Division has already articulated and highlighted for you, were met. We did put provisions in there. We did show maps. And if you look at the 411-141 provisions, it says that we must include maps; and we've got to show the boundaries of any public park or locations of any cultural resources, listed or eligible for listing at the National Register of Historic Places and known archeological sites within the permit adjacent areas, and so on and so forth. We did that. Even though we don't believe that Panguitch is part of the "adjacent areas," because ultimately Alton will be looking at further -- hopefully at further development into a federal area. And in response to request for information, Alton included that material in the permit application.

Now, that doesn't mean that Alton says that
Panguitch is part of the adjacent area. We do not
acknowledge that. And the argument has been made that,
because we included any materials in the permit
application package, we automatically accepted the fact
that Panguitch would be part of the adjacent area. That
is not true.

Secondly, much has been made about the

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circumstance of Highway 89. For as long as I have been practicing law in the mineral field -- in coal, which is now since the mid-80s -- I have never been required or know successfully that a permittee will have to permit a federal highway to the extent that it is open to the public and utilized by the public. If I am required to now show 89 as being part of my permit, I have to permit it; I have to make it as part of my permitted area; I have to bond it; and then I'm going to have to go out and do whatever reclamation is associated with that.

While the petitioners argue to you that there is no case law, there is no statute that specifically excludes federal highways -- these public roadways -- from the affected areas or the adjacent areas, that's not our responsibility to show that. And again, this goes back to the premise of what we're dealing with.

The petitioners have the burden to prove that what has been done in relationship to this permit application package is incorrect. They have the burden to show the error. It is not the responsibility by either the Division nor Alton to come forward and prove the legitimacy of the permitting process. It is not our responsibility, nor the responsibility of the Division, to prove the legitimacy of all the laws and statutes that are in place. We do not have to recreate, reconstruct,

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and prove that the permitting process is legitimate. It is presumed to be legitimate. Utah has been granted its primacy from out of the federal government. All of the rules and regulations of Utah have been approved by the federal government, and it is presumed that the Utah program is both legitimate, legal, and enforceable.

So going back now to the road issue, I don't have to prove that I have to exclude 89. They must prove that I have to include 89. Their argument, as part of their response to the motions, was that you're going to have hundreds of coal trucks traveling this road through the community of Panguitch. Well, this is a very, very busy highway. I have been told that there are probably -- and we'll be able to show this -- but there are probably over 900 heavy trucks that travel through Panguitch a day, already.

We're going to have -- let's say we have -- let's say we have 150 truck loads of coal that go through Panguitch. As a truck goes through Panguitch, it's full. As it comes back, it's empty. So obviously there's no adverse impact, because an empty truck is going to be less impact than a motor vehicle.

So the point is, is if, in fact, I do run coal through Panguitch -- and there's no guarantee yet that I do run coal through Panguitch -- I will have probably a

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minimal impact compared to the traffic that is already there. But yet they're saying that my coal trucks, I now have to make provisions to protect Panguitch from something that it is already experiencing, and that I have to take responsibility for that which is already occurring in Panguitch, and I get to have sole responsibility in the burden for caring for it. That seems fairly absurd, because no one can foist upon Alton responsibility that any other interstate carrier will not have to bear. That's an interesting topic unto itself. However, when you are dealing with the truck traffic through Panguitch, there is no plausible basis to require that we incorporate 89 within the permit.

I think that all the other issues, as far as Panguitch, are very, very succinctly resolved by:
There's no requirement to do anything more than that which was already done, and Alton has satisfied all the requirements set out. And the petitioners have not shown, as a matter of law, that there is anything that is more required than that which has already been placed in the permit application. And until they can get over that threshold -- which they cannot -- there is no claim for them to present. And that's the whole basis of what the Division has already articulated.

Similarly, when we talk about things such as air

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quality and wildlife, there are specific provisions for that which a permittee must put within a permit application. Alton complied with all of those. Imagine this -- and I'm sure you're all aware of this -- the Division basically goes through a checklist process. It knows what all the regulations are, it knows what all the rules are, all the statutes that must be complied with to evaluate a permit application. In the checklist it goes through, "Have they met the requirements for the following things." Among the "following things" is, we've got to put in a dust control plan. Now, they are required -- Utah requires that this dust control, this fugitive dust control plan, be reviewed by the Division of Air Quality and that we have to go through that process. It's consulted -- and that's what the regulations talk about, is consulted. They were consulted. The documentation is in the record to show the Division of Air Quality had an opportunity to comment on it, sent back the comment to the Division, and then the Division acted upon it.

Now, this goes back to, again, the deference to the technical expertise. There has been a dust control -- a fugitive dust control plan that has been put into the permit application package by Alton. And the Division has determined that it satisfies the technical

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requirements of a statutory framework and the regulatory framework. It's there.

This Board must now say that Utah law and federal law requires more than what is on this checklist for this to be an issue. And you have to say that. You have to come out and say that the entire permitting process is flawed, and that the Division's attempt to comply with the Division -- with the permitting process is incorrect. Because the Division is telling you, These are the requirements that a permit application must contain. And Alton is telling you, We complied with that and the Division concurs.

On the issue as to the lights, the bright sky, I'm not exactly sure what the issue really is. When the petition was filed, it seemed that they were arguing that there was going to be light pollution. And there was a letter in -- that was submitted from, I believe, the Forest Service to somebody, and they were talking about concerns over light pollution. Well, it's many, many miles away. And that is not a topic for a permit application for coal mining. Now, they may come into some consequences that relate to something else, but light pollution is not the part of the permit application package for a distant far. That's No. 1.

And secondly, there is no issue. If the Board

has any concern, there is no issue.

But now it seems within the response to the motions to dismiss, that they're raising some sort of issue that there would be a dust problem that would cause light diffusion, or some other matter.

The dust control issue is already addressed. It has been addressed, and it has been satisfied. There is no requirement, no jurisdiction, no legal basis for the state of Utah to now require more of a permit applicant as regards something that is many, many, many miles away, because of the fact the fugitive dust control plan is designed to do that, control the dust. It has satisfied the requirements under the regulations as to what it will do to control the dust. Again, the technical evaluation has been made.

So it's not a situation that Alton failed to comply with these regulations. Petitioners are not satisfied with it. And this goes back to what I said at the very beginning. They are not the ones with the discretion to decide whether or not the permit should have been issued, and they're not the ones that get to decide what should or should have not been involved with that.

On the wildlife protection, the arguments are all exactly identical. There is a requirement under the

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regulations that we must take into consideration the wildlife protection plan. It was reviewed, there was consultation made on that, and it had came back to the Division for review, and the Division has determined it to be complete and appropriate. There is no requirement under Utah law, there's no requirement under federal law, that the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources must sign off on this. And they can show no regulation that requires that.

The petitioners cannot require Alton to perform that which is not required by regulation. And again, they may not be happy with it, but it doesn't mean that I have to do what they want.

Fundamentally, Alton has complied with the requests on the wildlife protection plan -- on the mitigation plan for wildlife and the roadkill issue. And the provisions are there. And they address it. They address it in the exact manner as required. In some respect, Alton went beyond what is required by regulation. I don't think Alton should be punished for going beyond what is required, and I don't think that an inference should be made that just because Alton, in some areas, went beyond what is required, that they have now foisted themselves in a whole new avenue for scrutiny.

So I think these issues, very succinctly are:

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That the regulations set out very specific criteria that must be complied with; the permit application package includes the materials to satisfy those regulations; and it is not up to the petitioners to decide that there are more requirements; and that this Board has the right to look at these provisions and say they've complied with it, there's nothing further to review.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Are you through, Mr. Bayer?

MR. BAYER: I'm sorry?

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Are you through?

MR. BAYER: I think that is --

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: For now?

MR. BAYER: Yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Thank you. Mr. Bernard, you filed a memorandum in support of respondent's motion for partial summary judgment.

MR. BERNARD: I did.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: And did you want to address that, or is that -- is that what we're doing next?

MR. BERNARD: Well, I just think that on the issues currently that Mr. Bayer just addressed, I just want to say that Kane County concurs with both Division's counsel and Mr. Bayer. And as far as the issues on the air quality, that there may be both jurisdictional due process and equal protection issues there, which Mr.

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Bayer has addressed. It almost seems as though petitioners are trying to have it both ways.

There's a jurisdictional issue, obviously, on air quality. If Air Quality Division has control over the air quality, and now all of a sudden petitioners wants the Board to go back and seek a review of that, that brings up equal protection. Because equal protection requires persons similarly situated be treated similarly. Are we now going to revoke the permits on all other mines in Utah that were permitted, trusting Air Quality to provide the evaluation? Are we going to say, well, no, we're going to violate the due process rights of this ACD and allow them to be treated differently? Are we going to -- on the night skies issue, are we going to say that NEPA is no longer the controlling factor? It's the same issues there.

On the other issues, I think both Division's counsel and Mr. Bayer spoke elegantly.

As far as the motion for summary judgment -- my support on the motion for summary judgment, I think that it's confined to just what's before the issues I just addressed because of Ms. Dragoo's absence today.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Does the Board have any specific questions for Mr. Bayer or Mr. Bernard at this time --

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MR. JENSEN: No, but I heard Mr. Bernard refer to motions for summary judgment. It's my understanding that you are now treating them as motions to dismiss --

MR. BAYER: Yes, sir.

MR. JENSEN: -- consistent with the Division.

MR. BERNARD: That's correct. I stand corrected.

MR. JENSEN: Okay. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Okay. Let's move on, then.

Ms. Buccino, you're addressing this?

MS. BUCCINO: Yes. Sharon Buccino, and I'm responding for the petitioners and opposing the motion to dismiss on the three non hydrology issues -- the cultural resources, air quality, and wildlife.

Mr. Bayer did delve into a number of issues of factual dispute. Just to pull back and frame it in the context that's before the Board right now, what the Board does need to address and we will lay out is, as Mr. Bayer said, there are certain requirements, mandatory requirements in the regulations that the permit application has to have before the Division can approve it. And for cultural resources, air quality, and wildlife, our argument is that the application did not contain matters -- substance that the regulations clearly mandate have to be there.

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I'd like to start with the cultural resource issue. And the question really is: Was there an obligation to look at the impacts on the Panguitch National Historic District. The Division stated today that a determination had been made that it was not necessary to do so. I'd just like to clarify that actually in the technical analysis — the final technical analysis supporting the permit approval, the deficiency, the failure to identify and analyze the impacts on the Panguitch National Historic District was identified there. And so actually, the determination that was made was that there was inadequacy there. And the problem is, the permit application did not address it.

Now, the Division is arguing, now, that there is not a legal obligation to do that. And so that's what I'd like to address. Clearly, the petitioners have to spell out, in the regulations, the duty to analyze the Panguitch National Historic District.

And that flows directly from the obligation to look at the impacts from both the permit area and adjacent areas. Mr. Donaldson put up the applicable regulation defining "adjacent areas," which comes from -- its R645-100-200. And the language there that he put up before was, an adjacent area includes an area that, and I quote, "reasonably could be expected to adversely impact

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the impacted by proposed coal mining and reclamation operations."

The Division, itself, had determined that it could be reasonably impacted by the hundreds of new trips by the coal haul trucks through the Panguitch National Historic District. So "adjacent areas" does include the Panguitch National Historic District.

I'd also like to flag for the Board, in addition to the permit regs, there is a statutory duty under the Utah Code that any state agency, before engaging in an undertaking, evaluate the adverse impacts on cultural and historic resources. So in interpreting the -- interpreting the permit, the coal permit regulations, it does need to be interpreted in a way that's consistent with that Utah statutory duty related to cultural resources.

I'd also like to explicitly address the issue that was put forward related to whether the haul roads are, in fact, part of the permit area, which really is not a question that this Board needs to address, because we are not arguing that -- petitioners are not arguing that the haul road -- hauling coal on Highway 89 through Panguitch requires a permit. We're arguing that the impacts of that need to be analyzed in meeting the duty to protect cultural and historic resources. There's

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actually quite a bit of dispute -- and we've laid this out in our briefing -- related to the question of what haul roads do require a permit. But, in fact, the Board does not need to engage in trying to parcel that out.

That's where the reliance that Alton gave -they referred you to the 1995 letter addressing what haul
roads need to be permitted. Actually, the exact legal
status of what haul roads need to be permitted is up in
the air, but this Board does not need to address that
because the question is not what needs to be permitted.
We acknowledge that it's not within the permit area. But
the obligation to analyze cultural and historic resources
applies both to the permit area and adjacent areas. And
Panguitch National Historic District falls within the
definition of "adjacent area."

So if there aren't any questions on the cultural resource issue, I would go ahead and move to the air quality issue.

MR. JENSEN: I have a question. And I hear what you say about your not looking at the issue of Highway 89 and a permitting issue. But the fact that Panguitch falls within the adjacent area, which is, as I understand it, is 30 miles away. What would you say if it were on Highway 89 but the Panguitch Historic District was 100 miles away or 200 miles away or 400 miles away? Does

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it matter?

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MS. BUCCINO: I don't think there's -- as the language defining "adjacent area" referred to, it talks about evaluate it in the context. So I think it's difficult to come up with a fixed geographic scope. I don't think the fact that it's 30 miles precludes including it in an adjacent area. I think if it were 200, 250 miles away, clearly the question may become more difficult.

But I think the fundamental fact is that there are -- I mean, it's hundreds of new trips through this area. And so the question becomes, could somebody reasonably expect that that would be an impact of the mine that's being proposed. I think it is informative to look at how the issue of access roads has been dealt with in the context of the National Historic Preservation Act. And there actually is some federal case law that we cited in our brief, where the courts have established that you can't just say, in the context of oil and gas leasing, in evaluating cultural -- the impacts to cultural resources, you cannot just look at the leased parcel. The analysis must incorporate the access roads. Because if the activity -- oil and gas leasing or the coal mine -- but for that activity, these impacts, the coal trucks, would not be going through the national historic district.

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MR. JENSEN: Okay. I understand. It just seems to me that, you know, whether the Panguitch Historic District was immediately adjacent, I mean touching the border, or is 30 miles or 100 miles or 300 miles, at some point it can't be relevant, it would seem to me.

MS. BUCCINO: And I guess my response would be, under the circumstances here, 30 miles is relevant.

MR. JENSEN: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Ms. Buccino, I would appreciate if you'd give us a little more in-depth explanation, when you talked about the Division's technical analysis, including some kind of statement that the Panguitch Historic District needed to be -- or the transportation had to be addressed.

MS. BUCCINO: Right. It's at page 19 in the Final Technical Analysis. And the way this issue played out, according to the records that have -- you know, were publicly available on the Division's website, the Division flagged the failure to analyze the Panguitch National Historic District as a deficiency, yet went ahead and approved the permit without that analysis.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Explain to me what you mean by "flagged the deficiency."

MS. BUCCINO: They specifically identified the indirect effects from transportation as part of the

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analysis that needed to be included in the permit application, and yet went ahead and approved it without that.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$$ DONALDSON: I can clarify, if you want. Or we can do that later.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: No, please do that.

MR. DONALDSON: Okay. That part of the Technical Analysis is referring to the cultural resource management plan, which had a broader scope than the permit application. The cultural resource management plan was looking at also possible federal processes, and so it had a broader scope than the permit application process. So in any case, that may have been included in the technical analysis, but that was related to an amendment -- amendments that were made to the cultural resource management plan.

And there was no identified deficiency. I think she may be confusing the deficiency language with one that occurred related to air quality at one point.

MS. BUCCINO: Well, I think the record will speak for itself. I mean, the cite is to the Final Technical Analysis at page 19. And it does -- it is correct that it addresses the cultural management resource plan that was put forward.

Our argument is under the language of the

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regulations themselves, that Panguitch National Historic District is as relevant to the State's duty under its -- the Division's duty under state law, as relevant to that, as any duty that BLM, the Bureau of Land Management, would have under federal law.

But I think -- what I would argue is it is inaccurate to represent that a determination was -- well, what I can say is, nothing in the record that's been made available publicly today indicates that the Division actually made a determination that it was not necessary to include the Panguitch National Historic District.

That is an argument that was first presented in the briefs now, which is a fair argument to make, but as we've articulated, it's incorrect. There was -- there is, under the regulations, a legal duty to include Panguitch National Historic District because it is part of what falls within the scope of the meaning of "adjacent areas."

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: So Ms. Buccino, is your argument, then, that the Panguitch National Historic District was not adequately analyzed, it hinges upon your contention that the adjacent area -- effects on the adjacent area have to be analyzed, and also that the technical analysis included a comment about -- and reading from your response -- in quotes, "Indirect

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affects, such as transportation." So those two items are the basis of your argument?

MS. BUCCINO: Fundamentally, the argument is that the duty to look at cultural resources includes both the permit area and adjacent areas. The Panguitch National Historic District is within the term defined "adjacent areas." And the fact that the Division, in fact, agreed with it and acknowledged the relevance is one aspect to support that legal duty that's there.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: And that's based upon this statement at 19 in the Technical Analysis?

MS. BUCCINO: Yes. That is the statement I'm referring to in terms of what determination the Division made or not, yes.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Okay. Thank you.

MR. PAYNE: What's the date of that Technical Analysis?

MS. BUCCINO: I'm pretty sure it's dated

October 15, the same date at the decision document -- is
the Final Technical Analysis.

So if there are no other questions related to the cultural historic --

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Are there any other questions of Ms. Buccino at this time?

MS. BUCCINO: Then I'll turn to the air quality

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issues.

MR. HAROUNY: I have a question for you. It's in the same line.

Are there any other smaller communities that Highway 89 goes through in this general area?

MS. BUCCINO: There's no other national historic district at issue. There is -- I mean, there is the community of Alton that's affected, as well. But the -- that is the National Historic District that was flagged. And the National Park Service also requested -- in addition, there are numerous comments by residents there of Panguitch to address the impacts on that community. I'm not aware of other communities that raise the issue of the coal haulage going through them.

MR. HAROUNY: Is there an equal requirement to address the impact to either an EA or an EIS on smaller communities adjacent to?

MS. BUCCINO: The scope of what is required under NEPA -- we have not relied on NEPA as the source of the duty here. As far as I'm aware, there is not disagreement that this kind of analysis should be included within -- analysis done by the National Environment Impact, the Environmental Impact Statement that would be done under NEPA.

But I would like to clarify, because it was

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raised in the briefs, that the reference -- the explicit reference to reasonable foreseeable transportation routes within the cultural resource management plan that was developed, it's been argued that that's only applicable in the context of looking at the federal leases, because that document was being prepared to address the obligation there, as well as here.

Looking -- our argument is: Looking at the clear -- the unambiguous language of the Division's own permit regulations interpreted in the context of its statutory duty to protect historic and cultural resources, that looking at the transportation routes is encompassed within that state obligation, as well as any obligation that might flow from NEPA or other federal law.

MR. HAROUNY: I understand that. I was simply referring to smaller communities and other communities, and all the mitigating issues that would have to be addressed if there was an EIS or an EA requirement.

Those issues would have already been addressed by now.

MS. BUCCINO: That analysis has not been completed yet. It's undergoing. And as part of the NEPA process, there is a determination of the scope of the geographic area, within which cumulative impacts need to be addressed.

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MR. HAROUNY: And what is that? How large of an area is that?

MS. BUCCINO: As far as I am aware, it hasn't been determined yet in this context, because it's in the initial stages. There's no -- been no draft Environmental Impact Statement issue.

MR. HAROUNY: Do you agree as to the assertion that the scope of -- in a technical review, the scope of the actual resource management is larger and then brought down to the permit area. Do you agree with that?

MS. BUCCINO: Yes. And I think the Division has agreed with that, too.

MR. HAROUNY: Okay. No others.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Okay.

Please move ahead.

MS. BUCCINO: Yes. Turning to the air quality issues.

Here, I'd like to first clarify that the duty to address the night skies flows from the obligation, the requirement in the permit regulations, to have a sufficient fugitive dust control plan. And we raised this issue initially in our request for a hearing, and briefed it more fully in our response in opposition to the motion to dismiss.

Visibility, both at night and during the day, is

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clearly impacted by fugitive dust. The problem here is that the Division deferred analysis of the adequacy of that fugitive dust control plan to the Division of Air Quality, acknowledging — the Division acknowledging, itself, that it didn't have the expertise to evaluate it. That may be an appropriate course of action.

But the Division's own permit regulations prohibit it from approving the permit until that analysis of the adequacy has been done. And here it has not been done. And so there is a legal obligation that the Division has to ensure that the permit application includes an adequate fugitive dust control plan. And it has not fulfilled that obligation here.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Does the Board have any questions specific to that issue?

Please move ahead, then.

MS. BUCCINO: Okay. And then finally, the wildlife issue is very similar in the sense that you saw the cite to the clear requirement in the permit regs — it's at R645-301-330 — that there is a plan included to protect, among other things, wildlife resources. The petitioners do not argue that approval by the Division of Wildlife is necessary. What happened here is that the Division of Wildlife flagged insufficiencies in the plan that was submitted. And there is nothing in the record

to indicate that those sufficiencies (sic) were addressed before the permit application was approved by the Division. And they related to the monitoring of roadkill and also to the protection of habitat for sage grouse, in particular.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Any questions on that issue?

MS. BUCCINO: So --

MR. HAROUNY: Yes. Is any of this area within the sage grouse study, or endangered areas, or specific areas of sage grouse study?

MS. BUCCINO: I'm sorry. Could you repeat the question?

MR. HAROUNY: Are any of these areas within the sage grouse study area defined either by BLM or targeted by BLM or the State?

MS. BUCCINO: There has been specific areas of important sage grouse habitat that is affected by the proposed mine that was addressed. There -- it was addressed in the plan that was submitted. And the question, then, becomes the adequacy of the plan.

At the very least, that is a factual question that does not lend itself to resolution based on a motion to dismiss, because the requirement for a plan adequate to protect wildlife is clearly in the Division's permit regulations.

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MR. HAROUNY: And you're saying that it was -that the issue was not adequately addressed by the
Division?

MS. BUCCINO: That's correct. And the argument is not contingent on explicit approval by the Division of Wildlife. The Division of Wildlife, here, flagged insufficiencies that the record does not demonstrate were addressed. And that is the problem for the Division's permit approval on the wildlife issue.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Mr. Payne.

MR. PAYNE: Yeah. There's -- in the Request for Agency Action, there's two allegations relative to this wildlife question. And the first is that Division of Wildlife Resource has not approved the plan, and the second deals with the adequacy. I heard you deal with the adequacy. Can you tell us, or can you help me understand what the basis is for whether approval is required?

MS. BUCCINO: Okay. And just to clarify, that's not the argument that we made that explicit approval --

MR. PAYNE: I'm sorry, I'm reading right here from the Request for Agency Action where is says, "The permit application does not contain documentation established and that the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources has approved," ACD's Division of Wildlife

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Protection Plan. That's an explicit --

And this is No. 28 in your Request for Agency Action.

MS. BUCCINO: Go ahead.

MR. PAYNE: No, I'm just -- there's two pieces.

One is the approval --

MS. BUCCINO: Okay. So that's a factual assertion that they didn't approve it. All I'm saying is that we're not making the argument that they're legally required to do it.

So let me step back for a second. We make the factual assertion that the Division of Wildlife did not approve the plan. We do not argue that legally the Division of Wildlife had to. The argument we're making is that the Division of Wildlife identifies specific deficiencies. Because they identified those specific deficiencies, it seems reasonable that they -- that the Division should require that they be addressed to -- before moving forward to approve the permit. And there's nothing in the record that shows that they were addressed.

MR. PAYNE: Okay.

MS. BUCCINO: So that's simply a factual assertion that we're making, rather than a --

MR. PAYNE: So you are not arguing that approval

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is required?

MS. BUCCINO: That's correct -- by the Division of Wildlife.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Go ahead.

MS. BUCCINO: Just in sum, on those three issues, cultural, addressing the cultural and historic resources, addressing air quality, and wildlife, the petitioners have laid out the legal obligations to do -- to address those three issues. And for those reasons, granting a motion to dismiss would be unlawful. Thank you for your consideration.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Mr. Donaldson, let's go back to you for rebuttal. And we'll give everyone an opportunity. I would just ask the parties to try to limit any rebuttal to five minutes.

MR. DONALDSON: Okay. That's fine. Five minutes will be sufficient.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Thank you.

MR. DONALDSON: First of all, with regard to the cultural resources, the Board is aware that the Division does not regulate the public highways of the state of Utah. That authority lies in other agencies of the state. The Division has no authority over trucks, truck size, speed limit, or any other aspect related to the federal highways or to state highways.

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Second, it was pointed -- or it was stated earlier that there was a technical deficiency identified and related to the Panguitch National Historic District. That is not true. That is false. In the Cultural Resource Management Plan, there is some language related to reasonably foreseeable transportation routes. That language, the Cultural Resource Management Plan was prepared as part of a broader process than the state permit application process. And in terms of -- you've heard it stated by all of the parties that the Division did not consider the Panguitch National Historic District -- the cultural resources within that district -- to be within the adjacent area for this coal mining permit; and therefore, they did not analyze them. There's -- the Division didn't do it. The Board can make a legal determination that it was required to, but the Division didn't do it. So it's purely a legal question. No factual development is required. The Board can make that determination.

Second, I think it's important to point out that the State Historic Preservation Officer was consulted with regard to cultural and historic resources and, in fact, signed off on everything that the Division did with regard to cultural and historic resources. So that consultation process has occurred at a state level.

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out here is that, it's important in this motion to dismiss that the Board not focus on any factual -- any facts that are not alleged within the Request for Agency Action. The number of trucks that travel through Panguitch, et cetera, are not -- is not relevant to whether the Request for Agency Action states a legal claim -- a valid legal claim. The Board doesn't need to -- shouldn't be, shouldn't need to look into the permit, whether the permit includes certain things. Because the question really is whether the factual allegations state a legal claim, whether there's relief that can be granted for the violation that occurred.

Take as true that the Division failed to consider the Panguitch National Historic District. They did not consider that. Now, the question is whether they were required to by law. If they weren't, then that claim should be dismissed.

The other thing that needs to be addressed is whether -- for the determination of whether the Panguitch Historic District should have been included -- the definition of "adjacent area" I talked about, or referred to earlier, discussed whether -- talked about the context. Now, maybe an archeological site, cave painting that was located 30 miles from the mining site that --

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and the only traffic that ever went out there is coal mining truck that was going to the mine, you know, in that context, perhaps, you know, that might be needed to be analyzed. But in the context -- in this context, the Panguitch National Historic District where a major state highway travels -- goes right through the district -- in that context, it just is unreasonable to expect adverse impacts from the coal mining operation on those historic or cultural resources.

The comments that were received in the permitting process -- I don't know how much time I have; two minutes, okay -- were related to tourism. And the Division doesn't have -- again, this also relates to the fact that the Division doesn't have authority to regulate roads.

Now, with regard to air quality, there is no law requiring analysis of light pollution. And that has been admitted. The petitioners now try to say that the fugitive dust control plan is what they were referring to when they're talking about the clarity of the night sky. Well, that fugitive dust control plan has been submitted to the Division of Air Quality. The only requirement is that that plan comply with state and federal air quality standards. The Division doesn't make that determination. That determination is made by the Division of Air

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Quality. They will make that determination.

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Finally, with regard to wildlife, there is a plan for wildlife protection. There's no question about that. The Division consulted with the Division of Wildlife Resources. Division of Wildlife Resources provided comments. Now they're trying to back away -- or petitioners are trying to state that they're not arguing that the Division of Wildlife Resources was required to approve the plan. Instead, they're saying that the comments that were addressed must be -- or the comments that were made must be addressed by the Division. Well, that just is a de facto approval. That just means that the Division was required to defer to their recommendation and to get their approval before it can approve the permit. So it's nothing more than a little gymnastic maneuver to say that they weren't required to approve it. But in reality, they really are stating that they were required to approve it.

Now, just one last thing before I close. I just in this -- it's a motion to dismiss. And the important thing is to not get into that these claims shouldn't require factual development. If you -- if the Board believes that factual development is necessary, then these are not proper claims for dismissal. What you need to do is determine whether -- even based on the factual

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allegations made in the complaint -- whether there's a legal remedy for those claims.

Now, just, for example, just assume it's true that the Division didn't consider the night sky clarity. Well, they weren't required to; and so therefore, you can dismiss that claim. And you can go on in all three of these instances and just assume that the factual allegation is true.

Now, whether something is inadequate or not, that needs to be supported in the face of the Request for Agency Action. So they say that the protection plan, the Wildlife Protection Plan was inadequate. Well, that needs to be supported by specific, factual allegation. And they haven't made any specific factual allegation based on that. That is why we are seeking dismissal.

Well, we did find the Technical Analysis, page 19, if the Board would like a copy of that just to look at it.

MS. BUCCINO: Could you read number -- the relevant number?

MR. ALDER: I guess -- the argument is that it isn't relevant. You've asked about it, we have it.

MR. DONALDSON: Yeah, you've asked about it, we have it if you want a copy. I don't think it's necessary in order to determine whether to dismiss the claim, for

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the Board to look at it; but you can.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: I would like to receive a copy of it, please.

MR. DONALDSON: Okay.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Mr. Payne, do you have a question?

MR. PAYNE: Yeah. Mr. Donaldson, if I may ask a question or two. I've heard you say it twice now, that with regard to approval of the air plan, that that's an issue for the Department of Air Quality. I'm struggling with that notion that the Division is going to defer -- it's actually not going to take responsibility, in essence, for that decision, when it's a requirement of the regulations that the Division require and approve a plan. I would look at it as the Division of Oil, Gas, and Mining is using the Division of Air Quality as an extension of staff and relying on their expertise. But ultimately, it's the Division of Oil, Gas, and Mining that's taking responsibility, is it not, for --

MR. DONALDSON: Yes, that's true.

MR. PAYNE: -- approving that action?

MR. DONALDSON: Yes, that is true.

MR. PAYNE: In that case, where is the proper venue to challenge adequacy of that plan?

MR. DONALDSON: Well, I guess in that context,

[68] 1 if the Division is taking the responsibility for the 2 plan, the particular -- the particulars of the plan, because we're deferring to the technical expertise of the 3 Division of Air Quality, those particulars of the plan 4 would need to be appealed there and then thereafter 5 appealed here. So. 6 MR. PAYNE: Help me understand how this would be 7 8 appealed at Air Quality. MR. DONALDSON: They can feel free to enter 9 comments at the Division of Air Quality. 10 MR. PAYNE: "Enter comments." But I guess I'm 11 not understanding how it can be appealed at the Division 12 13 of Air Quality. MR. DONALDSON: Oh, they need a permit from Air 14 15 Quality. MR. PAYNE: They do? Okay. That's where I need 16 some help understanding. So subsequent to your issuing a 17 permit, Air Quality is going to have to issue a permit --18 MR. DONALDSON: Yes. 19 MR. PAYNE: -- and it's going to contain these, 20 and maybe other requirements? 21

MR. DONALDSON: Yes.

MR. PAYNE: Okay.

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MS. BUCCINO: And just directly on that point, though, the problem is, this permit was approved before

Air Quality has evaluated it in any -- the air quality permit is still pending. So our argument is that that had to happen, that approval by the Air Quality Division, of the fugitive dust control plan, had to happen before this permit could be approved by the Division, and it did not.

MR. PAYNE: Can you tell me where that's in the statute that there's an order to where -- how those permits are issued?

MS. BUCCINO: Well, the regulations -- the coal permit regulations, specifying what must be included in the permit application that the Division considers, includes the fugitive dust control plan, an adequate fugitive dust control plan. And that cite is at R645-301-423.200.

MR. JENSEN: And so you take the position that the issuance of the proposed permit, which provides a condition that says it is subject to -- that no mining can take place unless there is an air quality permit issued, you take that as that's not appropriate. Is that what you're saying?

MS. BUCCINO: Yes. Because to be complete, as specified by the Division's permit regulations, it must include an adequate fugitive dust control plan. And this permit was incomplete in that sense; and therefore, it

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was unlawful for the Division of Oil, Gas, and Mining to approve it.

MR. JENSEN: But wouldn't the Division of Air Quality need to look at the fugitive dust control plan in deciding that it's going to issue an air quality --

MS. BUCCINO: Yes.

MR. JENSEN: Okay. And how does it do that, then? It seems to me that you've got a permit applicant in a catch-22, because how do you know that you've got an approved fugitive dust control plan that can go to Air Quality if the Division hasn't signed off on it?

MS. BUCCINO: Well, the requirement -- well, we would argue the regulations require that the fugitive dust control plan, if the Division wants to defer to the expertise and utilize the expertise of the Division of Air Quality, then the Division of Air Quality must do its work first. It is a necessary legal prerequisite to this Division approving the coal permit application.

MR. JENSEN: Don't you get to the same place, though?

MS. BUCCINO: What we're looking at is the legal obligations of the Division under its permit regulations. In our view, the language requires that the Air Quality -- that the analysis, that in this case they've decided to defer to the Division of Air Quality, it must

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be done first as a necessary pre -- legal prerequisite for permit approval. And that did not happen here.

So what we would argue is that the Board should remand -- should, in a sense, remand the permit, invalidate the permit approval, and ensure that the action by the Division of Air Quality take place first, before this Division approves the permit on that issue.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Ms. Buccino, I want to be clear on this. You are saying that your argument is based upon R645-301-423?

 $\,$ MS. BUCCINO: There are a few different places that the fugitive dust control plan is --

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: This is where you've cited.

MS. BUCCINO: Well, there's -- we've provided all the cites in our brief. The one I just gave you was one piece of that, 301-423.200. I can list the other ones right now, if you'd like.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: 423 says, "The application will contain an air pollution control plan, which includes the following," and then there's paragraph 200, "A plan for fugitive dust control practices as required under 645-301."

Does the permit application include a dust control plan?

MS. BUCCINO: In our view, what is missing --

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: You are adding the word "approved" dust control plan. You're saying that this rule requires that that plan has already been approved. Is that what you are saying?

MS. BUCCINO: What I'm arguing is that it just can't be one piece of paper that has the title "Fugitive Dust Control Plan." It needs to be a plan that is adequate to meet the requirements, as specified there in the regulations.

The Division, itself, has admitted that it has not made that determination, that it's adequate. It is explicitly deferring --

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: The Rule requires that the application will contain an air pollution control plan. You are not contending that that plan is not in the application. You are contending that the plan has not been approved by the Division of Air Quality. Is that what your argument is?

MS. BUCCINO: No. I mean -- no, not exactly. CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Okay.

MS. BUCCINO: We're arguing that it must contain a fugitive dust control plan that is sufficient to meet the requirements of the permits -- the Division's regulations. And it talks about what that plan needs to include to be adequate. One of the requirements is to

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comply with federal and Utah air quality standards. That determination of adequacy or compliance has not been made. The Division acknowledges that it is deferring that determination to the Division of Air Quality.

And all we're arguing is that if it is due -- if it has decided to defer that determination, it can't then go ahead and approve the permit.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: And the permit was approved with the stipulation that no mining activities can occur until that plan has been approved by the Division of Air Quality. Is that correct?

MS. BUCCINO: We're arguing that that is legally insufficient under the terms of the regulations.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: And you are basing that on your argument on 423 and 423.200 --

MS. BUCCINO: Yes.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: -- is that correct?

MS. BUCCINO: Well, there's several pieces. 423 contains several different components. The complete list of the references to the regulations that we're relying on is provided in our briefing. I'd be happy to recite it again here. But I'd prefer to just defer to that list. That is the --

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: In your paragraph, it talks about it. It says, "The unambiguous language of the

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Division's own regulations." And you don't cite any rule in that paragraph. So I'm trying to determine exactly what rule it is that you're talking about.

MS. BUCCINO: Okay. So on page 12 of our opposition brief --

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Correct.

MS. BUCCINO: -- the paragraph there, the first paragraph lays out the regulatory authority establishing the -- related to the obligation to submit a fugitive dust control plan.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: And the first citation you have in that paragraph is R645-301-423.200.

MS. BUCCINO: Correct, uh-huh.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: So that is your basis for your argument that the plan has to be approved prior to the permit being approved?

MS. BUCCINO: Well, then we cite -- well, not only does 423.200 then cite to two other regulations, but we cite to several other regulations in that same paragraph. So that's what we would be relying on in support of that obligation.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Okay. So 423.200 and the two regulations that it cites?

MS. BUCCINO: No.

MR. DONALDSON: I think also 423.100. Is that

[75] 1 right? 2 MS. BUCCINO: Well, I can go through and list them all, right here. But I guess what I'm resisting is 3 your -- well --4 5 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: I'm trying to understand exactly where it is that you claim --6 7 MS. BUCCINO: Fair enough, yes. 8 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: -- where in the rules that it cites that the air pollution plan has to be approved 9 before the mining permit can be approved. 10 MS. BUCCINO: Okay. So let me take a minute to 11 step --12 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: I know you've made that 13 argument. And I want to know exactly where it is --14 15 MS. BUCCINO: Just let me take a minute to step through that. Because it starts, yes, with 301-423.200. 16 17 And that -- well, actually the beginning of the -- the whole air quality -- I mean, you really would want to 18 19 look at -- the whole section dealing with air quality is 301-420. And then it has several different components 20 within it. We tried to flag the specific components 21 22 within 420 that deal explicitly with the fugitive dust

So 423 is the piece dealing with the mine of certain size, which there is no dispute that this mine is

control plan, and -- just one second here. Okay.

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proposed to be 2 million tons. The size threshold here is 1 million tons per year.

And then there are two different pieces to that: 423.100, "An air quality monitoring program to provide sufficient data to evaluate the effectiveness of the fugitive dust control practices proposed under 645-301-423.200 to comply with federal and Utah air quality standards." And then 423.200, "A plan for fugitive dust control practices as required under," and then it refers back to 244 -- 301-244. And that is where the language comes from related to -- so 244.100, "All exposed surface areas will be protected and stabilized to effectively control erosion and air pollution attendant to erosion."

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Let me try to explain what it is I'm trying to understand here. It says in 423, "The application will contain an air pollution control plan." My understanding is that the petitioner has an air pollution control plan included in the permit application, okay.

Now, maybe your argument will make a lot more sense to me if this regulation said, "Will contain an approved air pollution control plan," because that air pollution control plan has been submitted and the Division has referred that plan to the Division of Air

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Quality and has issued the mine permit with the stipulation that no mining activity can occur until this plan has been approved by the Division of Air Quality. That would be a lot more clear to me if it said, "The application will contain an approved air pollution control plan." I'm trying to understand if there's some place you can cite for me that specifically says in the course of action that the Division has taken that it has to be approved first.

MS. BUCCINO: Right. Okay. Well, let me -- I hear what you're saying. And let me refer you to the regulations at the very beginning, toward the beginning of the permit regulations, which deal with the Division's fundamental obligation in reviewing a permit, which are the specific written findings for permit application approval. And this is at R645-300-133. And it says there that, "No permit application or application for permit change will be approved unless the application affirmatively demonstrates and the Division finds, in writing, on the basis of information set forth in the application or from information otherwise provided." And then it goes through to list the specific things, one of which, and this is 133.100, "The application is complete and accurate, and the applicant has complied with all the requirements of the State program."

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So our argument is that you can't just submit a piece of paper that has a title. That there is a duty that the Division has to ensure the sufficiency, the adequacy of the fugitive dust control plan, based on information that has been set forth to it in the permit application, and as to air quality that has not occurred, and it needs to legally occur before the Division can approve this permit. That conditioning it is not legally sufficient.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Okay. I understand what you're saying.

MS. BUCCINO: If I may, there were just a couple of other points I wanted to add to what Mr. Donaldson had just said.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Okay. Let's go to Mr. Bayer first, Mr. Bayer and Mr. Bernard. We'll come back to you.

MR. BAYER: Right now, if I could, Mr. Allen has got some comments on most of this, and then I may have just a couple points to add. But we won't belabor the issue.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Okay. Thank you.

MR. ALLEN: Since we're on the topic now, let's talk about air quality first, and then I'll have some comments on the Panguitch Historic District.

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Here's what Alton suggests you should rule on the air quality issue. We suggest that you issue a ruling that the Division's method of assuring that the air quality plan was adequate for the purposes of permit approval, was completely reasonable and not arbitrary and capricious.

As you've learned, the Division chose to defer detailed analysis of the sufficiency of the dust control plan to the Division of Air Quality. And they conditioned operations under the permit on issuance of the air quality permit. Now Alton takes a bit of a chance there in accepting their permit from the Division -- from this Division -- that Air Quality might go ahead and make some modifications. But I think that there is simply no merit to the chicken and egg argument that petitioners are putting before you, that the only method to assure that the fugitive dust control plan or the air quality plan is adequate is to require Air Quality to approve first.

I think the Division's approach to this was reasonable under the circumstances, was not arbitrary and capricious. And that's what we'd ask you to rule.

Turning to the issue of the Panguitch National Historic District. The reason that this is up in front of you on a motion for summary judgment is that it is --

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as you've been told -- it is purely a question of whether there was a legal requirement to consider the effects on the Panguitch Historic District. And I believe, Members of the Board, that answering that question can be done entirely by turning to the definitions that have already been cited here with regard to -- for the Code rules.

And one important piece of clarity that we've gotten out of petitioner's argument is that in determining whether there is an effect on Panguitch, it's not about the road, it's about the trucks. The concern is that the passage of trucks is causing some sort of an adverse effect, or might cause some sort of an adverse effect, on the historic district. And you've heard petitioners tell you that the reason that the historic district is significant is because it is part of the adjacent area, as that term "adjacent area" is defined by this Board's rules.

Permit me to read the definition. "Adjacent area," and we're at R645-100-200. "Adjacent area means the area outside the permit area where a resource or resources, determined according to the context in which the adjacent area is used, are or reasonably could be expected to be adversely impacted by proposed coal mining and reclamation operations, including probable impacts from underground workings."

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Here is the reason why the Panguitch National Historic District is not included. The passage of trucks hauling coal in interstate commerce after they've left the mine on a federal highway is not a coal mining and reclamation operation. There is simply no legal authority for that proposition, at all. But we're in luck on this matter, because the Board has also defined coal mining and reclamation operations. And so we turn the page over. "Coal mining and reclamation operations" means --

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Excuse me, where are you reading from, Mr. Allen?

MR. DONALDSON: We're still in the definition section R645-100-200.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Thank you.

MR. DONALDSON: "Activities conducted on the surface of lands in connection with the surface coal mine, or subject to the requirements of Section 40-10-18, surface coal mining and reclamation operations and surface impacts incident to underground coal mining" -- certainly not that -- "the products of which enter commerce, or the operations of which directly or indirectly affect interstate commerce. Such activities include all activities necessary and incidental to the reclamation of the operations" -- hauling the coal down

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the highway in trucks certainly isn't necessary or incidental to reclamation -- "excavation for the purpose of obtaining coal" -- no, we're well past that part of the process by the time the trucks are rolling through Panguitch -- "including common methods such as contour, strip, auger" --

(Reporter interruption.)

MR. ALLEN: "...including such common methods as contour, strip, auger, mountaintop removal, box cut, open pit, and area mining; the use of explosives and blasting" -- that doesn't involve the trucks rolling through Panguitch -- "in-situ distillation" -- I'm not sure I even know what that is, but I don't think it's happening on Highway 89 or is going to happen -- "retorting, leaching, or other chemical or physical processing; and the cleaning, concentrating, or other processing or preparation of coal. Such activities also include the loading of coal for interstate commerce at or near the mine site." And then there are a few provisos that I'll simply represent to you that don't apply.

But coal mining and reclamation operations for the purpose of your authority to regulate ends with the loading of coal at or near the mine site.

MS. BUCCINO: I'm sorry, but I just have to interrupt, because you stopped --

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CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Excuse me, Ms. Buccino. Let's let Mr. Allen finish.

MS. BUCCINO: All right.

MR. ALLEN: I'll take just a minute to read the rest of that definition to see if there's anything relevant there. There's reference to haul roads and access roads, and mine sites typically contain those things. They're a necessary part of the surface disturbance of mining, whether it's surface or underground mining. But there is, I think, no reasonable reason to treat Highway 89, a four-lane federal highway rolling through the town of Panguitch, as a haul road or an access road under the meaning of the regulations.

Now, Ms. Buccino is correct that the question of what roads need to be permitted has been the subject of considerable and inconclusive litigation. And we cited one of those cases, the Harmon Mining Case, in our brief. And the important point out of that case is that when it comes to haulage, there is a spectrum of activity, from the immediate haulage from the mine site -- or from the mine face, I should say, to the other operations that are occurring on the mine site, itself, to get the coal to where it can be processed or loaded. In some cases, mines have to build their own access roads from a public highway to the mine; and under some cases those have to

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be permitted. So there are lots of roads that are closely associated with mining that the courts usually hold need to be permitted.

And at the other end of the spectrum, according to the Harmon Mining case, are things like interstate highways, four-lane federal highways, that are clearly at the other end of the spectrum and don't require permitting. And I think the same analysis applies, that we are so clearly at the other end of the spectrum here, and so far removed from the mine site, that it simply makes no sense.

I mean, what the petitioner is asking this Board to do is to extend it's regulatory authority in a breath-taking way. To suggest that once the coal leaves the mine, whether by truck or railroad, or whatever, if it might pass by some sort of facility that might trigger regulation, this Board should reach out and regulate that. Please. That's asking you to move the marker dramatically from wherever it is now. And Alton suggests you simply don't do it.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Thank you, Mr. Allen.

Mr. Bayer -- or Mr. Allen, did you have any more on -- I think you made your point on that matter.

MR. ALLEN: Yeah, I don't. I should mention that Mr. Bernard from Kane County has kindly offered to

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cede his five minutes of rebuttal to us, if that's necessary.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: I didn't hear Mr. Bernard do that.

MR. BERNARD: I will do that, and am doing that. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Go ahead, Mr. Bayer.

MR. BAYER: Just a couple quick points. First off, it is not unusual that in the mining industry that an issuance of a coal mining permit is one aspect of the various different types of permits and licenses you have to obtain. So the mere fact that we're waiting on the issuance of another permit is not unusual, number one.

Secondly, there may be some -- I'm going to say, misunderstanding as far as what's going on -- is the Utah regulations require that the application contain a dust control plan. That's at 423-200, "A plan for fugitive dust control practices, as required, must be submitted."

Later on, though, it talks about how you do the air monitoring, okay. And if you look at 425, it says, "All plans for surface coal mining reclamation activities with projected production rates of 1 million tons or less will include an air quality monitoring program, if required by the Division, to provide sufficient data to judge the effectiveness of the fugitive dust control plan," so on

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and so forth.

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What we're waiting on from the Division of Air Quality is, No. 1, their permit that says that our dust control plan will satisfy their requirements in addition to the requirements for the dust control plan that we have to submit to the Division of Oil, Gas, and Mining, No. 1.

And No. 2, there seems to be great emphasis made about how is the dust control and air quality going to be monitored. That seems to be a point they're hanging up on in their memorandum. The air monitoring may not be done by the Division of Oil, Gas, and Mining, but it may be done by the Division of Air Quality. And their permit is specifically going to address the issues of how the monitoring is going to be done, and how we're going to maintain quality of the air. That is separate and distinct from the application of the Division of Oil, Gas, and Mining. And that's not unusual in the coal mining industry, that I've got to get a permit from somebody else before I get to the point where I can actually mine. If I'm on BLM land, I've got to do this. If I'm on private land, I've got to do that. And that's not unusual. So the mere fact, and as the chairman was very quickly and astutely able to identify, the requirement is not that I have to have a dust control

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plan that has been approved by someone else, it just says
I have to have a dust control plan.

Now, the fact that I have an obligation to also get a permit from the Division of Air Quality -- they have made their permit contingent upon it -- my permit is also contingent upon the fact I can't start to mine until I put a reclamation bond up. That doesn't mean the permit is any less valid because there's a contingent provision in there that says I can't mine before I do something. And I think that the emphasis that the petitioners are trying to make skews the analysis; and that is, that we have met the requirements for what we do with the Division of Oil, Gas, and Mining, but we also have other requirements.

And the fact that the Division may be deferring to someone else, as far as monitoring the air quality, and deferring to someone else, as to whether or not -- to make sure we do comply with the air quality standard, has nothing to do with the fact that we did submit a dust control plan. It's in the permit application.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Thank you, Mr. Bayer.

Mr. Bernard you've ceded your time?

MR. BERNARD: I have. I had, sir.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Ms. Buccino. I know you have

some things you want --

MS. BUCCINO: Just a few quick points.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Thank you.

MS. BUCCINO: I would like to start with the definition of coal mining and reclamation operations, which is part of R645-100-200. And a key piece that Mr. Allen did not get to is the inclusion. And I quote here, "All lands affected by the construction of new roads or the improvement or use of existing roads to gain access to the site...." And then it goes on to say, "...site of those activities, and for haulage and excavation, workings, impoundments, dams, and ventilation shafts."

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Can you tell me again where it is you are reading? You are reading from the definitions?

MS. BUCCINO: Right. It's the definition of "Coal Mining and Reclamation Operations," found at R645-100-200. And that specific language is a little bit further than about halfway down in the text.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Okay. And it's -- and that section is, like, six pages long.

MS. BUCCINO: Well, right. So within that section of definitions, if alphabetically it's listed, you'll find the term "Coal Mining and Reclamation Operations," and that's what Mr. Allen was reading from earlier.

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CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Okay. And your contention -the part that you added to what Mr. Allen said, would you
please go through that again so I can highlight it?

MS. BUCCINO: Right. And my point is that that definition, even though he didn't read it, does explicitly include the use of existing roads for haulage. And I read the exact language, which I'll quote again.

"All lands affected by the construction of new roads or the improvement or use of existing roads to gain access to the site of those activities and for haulage."

But again, I think the fundamental issue that I'd like to bring the Board back to is, it is not a question of what roads must be permitted, but what roads must be analyzed. And the duty to look and analyze cultural and historic resources is tied to both the permit area and adjacent areas. And our argument is that Panguitch National Historic District is within the defined term "adjacent areas."

Second, I'd just like to clarify, once again, there have been several references to motions for summary judgment and to genuine disputes of material fact. As we indicated, there was an agreement at the beginning that these three issues, as being considered by the Board, were going to be done in the context of the Division's motion to dismiss. And that has a certain standard that

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goes with it, which includes accepting all of the factual allegations made by the petitioners as true, and viewing the claims in the most -- in the light most favorable to the petitioners. So the questions that we've -- the question for the Board to resolve here, now goes to the legal obligations of the Board. Was there a legal obligation to analyze the Panguitch National Historic District? Was there a legal obligation to look at night skies? And we've argued that there was, and spelled those requirements.

The questions as to the adequacy of the fugitive dust control plan or the adequacy of the wildlife plan, those are clearly things that require factual inquiry, so those claims cannot be dismissed based on motion to dismiss at this point, unless they, for example, related to night sky. You determine there was just no legal obligation to look at that issue at all.

And then the final point I would just like to make goes to the impacts of the coal trucks along the haul road. And in fact, there are unique and different impacts that come from the hauling of coal than might come from other trucks. The coal dust that's generated is an impact that you wouldn't have from other trucks. But those issues as to the exact nature of the impacts really don't go to the question the Board needs to

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address right now; which is, you know, under the regulations can it be clearly determined that dealing with the Panguitch National Historic District is completely beyond the scope of what the Division and Alton needed to address at this point. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Okay. Does the Board have any questions?

MR. HAROUNY: Just a correction. She mentioned the legal obligation of the Board. I'm sure you meant the Division.

MS. BUCCINO: The Division, yes. Thank you. CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Any other questions,

comments?

MR. PAYNE: Just real quick. I'm a miner, so when I read the word "haulage," I, unfortunately, don't have a definition. Haulage and haul roads typically refer to the movement of materials on the mine site to a point of loading to put them into commerce. Would you have this Board expand the definition of "haulage" and "haul road" to mean off-mine site in commercial transport of these materials?

MS. BUCCINO: Yes. I mean, it would include haulage on roads being used for access to the mine. And in fact, that -- I think the question of what -- I think you are referring to the -- well, what exactly does

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"haulage" mean within the scope of this definition of coal mining and reclamation operations.

MR. PAYNE: Correct.

MS. BUCCINO: My argument would be that it refers to the use of existing roads to gain access to the site and for haulage. So yes, I would interpret that to include access roads off the technical mine site.

MR. PAYNE: Okay.

MR. HAROUNY: Would that --

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Well --

MR. HAROUNY: I'm sorry.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Go ahead.

MR. HAROUNY: Would that also include, say, I-15, or some other major freeway that the trucks would get on.

MS. BUCCINO: Well, that question goes exactly to the very difficult question that the State of Utah and the Federal Office of Surface Mining have not been able to definitively resolve, because where do you draw that line exactly? Our position is that the Board, here, does not need to resolve that. We are not talking about whether the road needs to be permitted or not. It's whether it needs to be -- whether the impacts of the proposed mine, including the roads, the trucks that are traveling through Panguitch, need to be analyzed. It is

not a question of whether that road needs to be permitted and included within the permit area.

MR. HAROUNY: Does Highway 89 go right through the mine?

MS. BUCCINO: No, there's -- no. The -- no, it does not. It goes right through the Panguitch National Historic District.

MR. HAROUNY: So there are other haul roads that connect to it. And those roads have been part of the permit application, correct, the haul roads from the mine?

MR. BAYER: Well, if I can interject here, and I think this goes back to the point that Mr. Payne was making. The term "haulage" and "haul road" is a term of art within the mining industry within surface minings, especially. And it does not deal with the transportation of coal. It specifically deals -- and if you look at the context of the definition, and it says, "...those activities, and for haulage and excavation."

Generally what happens is, the haulages where they will be transporting coal across the surface of a mining area to, say, either to stockpile it, to take it to an area that would be used for processing, or something like that; or haulage might be where they are hauling dirt or rock on the mine site to stockpile for

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later reclamation purposes. "Haulage" does not include transportation. So if, in fact, I have a mine permitted area in which I have a haul truck that's going to be going from this point A to this point B, unless that area that that haul truck is traveling is permitted, then I am off permit. The minute my tire gets off permit, if it's on this haul route, I'm off permit, and I'm subject to a violation and CO. So haulage is not transportation.

And if you read this entire paragraph in the sentence in context, it says, "Those lands affected by the construction of new roads, or the improvement or use of existing roads to gain access to the site for those activities and for haulage and excavation," so on, and so forth. So I-70 is not a haul road. 89 is not a haul road. That area upon the permitted site in which I'm either hauling dirt, rock, or coal is my haul road. And that has to be permitted.

MR. JENSEN: You know, I appreciate the discussion and the bantering that's going back and forth. But isn't the issue relative to the Panguitch National Historic District, whether or not it's in the adjacent area? That's what this Board has to decide. If we decide it's in, then there's an issue. If we decide it's out, that issue is over, subject to an appeal. I mean, isn't that -- we're having all this discussion, but I

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think that's just noise. I think the issue is whether we've got it within the adjacent area or not.

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MR. BAYER: Correct. And that's why the definition of the "Coal Mining and Reclamation Operations" is important in that sense, because it is incorporated within the definition of "adjacent area." So if it's not part of the coal mine operations or reclamation, it cannot be part of the adjacent area.

MS. BUCCINO: No, that I -- well, I would take a different position. And I agree, yes, absolutely, the relevant term is what is within -- is Panguitch within the adjacent area. And so you turn to that term. And in my view the key language there is, "reasonably could be expected to be adversely impacted by proposed coal mining and reclamation operations." It doesn't require that the whole road be included within that permitted area. It just needs to be in an area impacted, "reasonably expected to be adversely impacted" by the activities, the coal mining and operation activities. And in fact -- and that's where I think it is relevant, to look at the final technical analysis, because you have not only the National Park Service and the concerned citizens from Panguitch providing evidence as to the expectation, but the Division, itself, included the use of Highway 89 as part of the reasonable -- the reasonably expected

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transportation route. And I would argue that is clearly within the scope of the meaning of "adjacent area."

MR. BAYER: And this is where I disagree, because the fact that the -- the definition of the adjacent area "to be adversely impacted by proposed coal mining or reclamation operations" means transportation is not part of that definition. And the transportation of coal that comes from a mine has nothing to do with the definitional standard of coal mining and reclamation operations. And the definition for "adjacent area" is dependent upon the definition of "coal mining and reclamation operations."

So yes, if my haul road is going through

Panguitch, then I'm going to be affecting it by my mining
and reclamation operations. But that's not the

circumstance. Once I am completely off permit, and I am

not affecting anything with my mining and reclamation

operations as defined, I'm outside the scope of what is
an adjacent area. Panguitch is well beyond what would

normally be considered. And again, you are looking at
the terms in context of what would be the adjacent area.

And as you've reasonably identified that if we accept the
petitioner's description of what is an adjacent area,
then it becomes wholly arbitrary as far as distance. We
have no idea where it is. Alton has no idea what is the

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adjacent area. Does that mean I have to go -- I have to start from the mine and go all the way through to the end user of coal -- it gets on a truck or a train -- and figure out whether or not they are adversely affected.

And if that's the case, then I just included the entire United States, potentially, in the adjacent area. And I think that's a burden that you cannot put upon a permittee, and it's a burden you can't put upon the Division to try to figure out. But that's the net effect of what they are asking.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Are there any other questions from the Board? Okay. I believe we're at the point we should break for lunch.

My understanding is that there is still some negotiations between the parties relative to the discovery. Is that correct?

MR. MORRIS: Really not negotiations -- CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Discussions?

MR. MORRIS: -- Mr. Chairman, but we need to produce a written document.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Is there a certain amount of time that we should allocate for lunch that might help the parties get this accomplished? I don't want to bring you back early and then -- if another 10 or 15 minutes would have made a big difference to you being able to

accomplish this.

Are you going to be doing this during lunch?

MR. BAYER: That would be my plan to accommodate the Board. There's no reason for you folks to wait on us.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Okay. Are there any suggestions how long we should break for?

MR. BAYER: Hour and a half.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Okay. It's now about 20 minutes to 1:00. Let's reconvene at 2:15.

MR. JENSEN: May I ask a question? Is it the expectation that you are going to reduce your stipulation to writing in a proposed Order, or that you're going to have a proposed stipulation and Order which you can read into the record? I guess either one would suffice.

MR. BAYER: Mr. Jensen, I think that we can read it into the record. I think we're close enough that we can do it. If that facilitates the Board so that we don't have to break for a long period of time, I would suggest that. But I'm not sure if the petitioners are acceptable to that notion.

MR. MORRIS: Assuming we get to something we agree to read into the record, we're happy with that procedure. And I think we are. I don't mean to make this as contingent as it probably sounds. I'm just

trying to be careful.

MR. JENSEN: Seems to me it might expedite -might be easier to have them agree and read into the
record. Because now we've got the transcript of both the
stipulation and the proposed Order.

MR. ALDER: Thank you.

MR. JENSEN: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Okay. So let's break for lunch. We'll reconvene at 2:15. That's about an hour and a half from now.

(A break was taken from 12:41 p.m. to 2:23 p.m.)

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Let's go back on the record.

I'm not sure what items you are talking about, Mr. Bayer, but let's go back on the record.

MR. BAYER: Clarification of some items. I think that this morning when we were talking about that there were some matters that motions for either dismissal, or phrased as motions for summary judgment, were tendered to the Board, were filed for consideration. And we indicated to the Board this morning that those were matters that we wanted to pull back away from for discussion for today. And you had indicated that that would be at the discretion of the Board as to what to do with that. And I thought we might be able to get on the record, right now, what the Board's position will be, and

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whether or not we are going to be required to address those issues today, or whether or not the Board will accept our request to withdraw those issues for consideration at the time being.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: You are talking about the --

MR. BAYER: -- hydrology issues.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: -- hydrology?

MR. BAYER: Yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: I don't think the Board is opposed to you withdrawing that for today.

MR. JENSEN: As I understand it, you are not withdrawing the motion, you are just asking that it not be heard today.

MR. BAYER: That's correct.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: And I think the Board is fine with that.

MR. BAYER: Because those will probably eventually be a component of a more comprehensive motion to dismiss.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Yes.

Is there anyone on the Board that's --

MR. GILL: I think that's my understanding.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: -- that wants to hear that

argument today?

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We will not be hearing that today, then.

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MR. BAYER: Thank you. The second item that I would like to address, at least initially with the Board, is, we have come to an agreement upon discovery. And we will present to the Board what we consider as a stipulation among the parties. And obviously, it's going to be within the purview of the Board to make a decision as to whether or not that will be acceptable to the Board, obviously. Because I can't dictate to the Board what it's going to do as far as how it's going to view discovery.

But we think that we'll have resolved many of the issues that would otherwise be contentious between the parties over discovery issues, and done with the idea that we're going to try to expedite everything, narrow the focus, and move on as quickly as possible.

We are going to set amongst ourselves some time deadlines that we think are attainable and reasonable, not terribly ambitious. But from the Board's perspective, we're going to ask that the Board set aside a day, which would be a -- the March hearing day, the fourth Wednesday, allow us to be on the agenda for that day for whatever motions or dispositive matters, or other matters that may be necessary to bring before the Board. And we would like to have us tentatively included on that March docket, at this point in time. I'm not saying that

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there are necessarily any issues that might have to come up, but certainly in anticipation, as we're processing through everything, that, if possible, I would like to have the Board consider allowing us to, kind of, reserve some time on the -- I believe it's the 24th, on that docket day.

Then we're also going to ask that the Board provide us with a hearing date, a full hearing in April, perhaps mid-April, that would be a date that would be a special date, separate from your normal day, so that you will not -- hopefully that it will expedite matters for you folks, as well. Our goal is to narrow the issues as much as possible that will be presented to the Board for disposition for hearing. We're narrowing the scope of how many witnesses that we think will be required from both sides. And we're going to try to present something to the Board as quickly and as easily and as digestible as possible.

But we think that we might well be served by having a special hearing day or two set aside in April, at the Board's pleasure, if that's possible.

MR. JENSEN: Again, the purpose of the April hearing would be for what?

MR. BAYER: The April hearing?

MR. JENSEN: April date.

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MR. BAYER: That would be the formal hearing.

MR. MORRIS: The evidentiary hearings.

 $\label{eq:chairman_johnson:} \text{On the Request for Agency} \\ \text{Action.}$

MR. JENSEN: So that is the hearing that you are asking for, a couple of days separate and apart from our regularly scheduled --

MR. BAYER: Yes, sir, if that would be possible, Mr. Jensen.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: And Mr. Bayer, none of the parties anticipate coming before the Board for anything in the February hearing?

MR. BAYER: Not at the February hearing. We're going to try to do as much of our discovery and site inspections and so forth that we can accomplish utilizing February. To get that accomplished moving into March with discovery, trying to get all of our discovery issues completed by about the third week of March. And then that would allow us that if we need to come to the Board at that March meeting on any issues, we should, amongst ourselves, have most everything compressed in a very workable fashion, so that it should be very limited if necessary to come to the Board in March. We may not, I don't know.

But we'd like to have our names kind of put on

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the docket for March, if need be, and then set aside maybe a couple of days in April, at the Board's pleasure, where we could have the formal hearing.

MR. MORRIS: Can I speak --

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Yes, Mr. Morris.

MR. MORRIS: -- to this?

I agree with everything that Mr. Bayer has said here, in terms of our understandings and where we would like to go. But at this point, I want the Board to understand that, as you will hear later, we have agreed to do a site visit in February, or perhaps early March. And we are concerned that conditions will not allow the completion of all of the work that our expert needs to do during that site visit. The other side understands our concern.

And what we read you this afternoon will reserve to the petitioners the right to come back and request a follow-up visit to do the things that are necessary, if there are any, once we go out and take a look at the site and find that all the work that needs to be done -- all our expert's work that needs to be done can't be done because of site conditions. And so the agreement that we have to move toward a hearing in mid-April, while it's very real, is going to be subject to our opportunity to come back and explain that we need to conduct a site

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visit -- a second site visit to finish up, due to
conditions that simply don't allow our expert to do his
job.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: And you're talking about snow cover, I assume?

MR. MORRIS: Snow cover is the primary.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: I don't think that anything that you've proposed would be objectionable to the Board. I think the Board will, among itself, will talk about possible dates for April. There's no guarantee we can come up with any workable dates.

MR. BAYER: We understand.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: The April hearing is scheduled for the fourth Wednesday. It's possible that it could be that time; and we may, if we can't conclude the hearing on that date, and if we can't come up with stand-alone dates for full day hearings, we'll need to come up with something. So give the Board the opportunity to talk about it and see if there are any dates we can come up with. If we can, then we'll float those dates out to you as early as possible -- if we can come up with those dates.

MR. BAYER: And that's why I thought -- from a housekeeping standpoint -- I thought this would be something readily addressed at this point in time. .

[106] 1 MR. BERNARD: Could I address one issue to the 2 Board? CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Yes, sir. 3 MR. BERNARD: This morning when we started, I 4 think it was mentioned, at least as to my motion, that I 5 had not yet read the response that Mr. Morris had kindly 6 provided. He's now agreed to provide even more, 7 electronically, to my private email. And the Board said 8 it would decide whether it was okay to argue that at the 9 next hearing. I'd like permission to argue it at that 10 time. I have not yet seen the response -- Mr. Morris' 11 response. 12 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: On which motion was that, 13 Mr. Bernard? 14 15 MR. BERNARD: It was basically the one that dealt with the takings and the losing support of Alton's 16 motion for summary judgment. 17 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Okay. 18 MR. JENSEN: And you're suggesting that would be 19 at the March hearing, since there's not going to be --20 you're not going to be before us in February? 21 MR. BERNARD: If it pleases the Board. 22 23 MR. JENSEN: All right. May I ask the Division: Are there any matters now that are scheduled for March, 24 25 to your knowledge, any other matters?

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1 MR. ALDER: I don't know of anything. We usually don't know that far ahead. 2 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: We actually have a request 3 from SUWA to move a matter from February to March. But 4 we haven't decided whether we'd agree to that or not. 5 MR. ALDER: I'm sorry. I wasn't aware of that. 6 7 MR. JENSEN: I would suggest, since we've got 8 numerous counsel coming from different areas, that this matter be scheduled first for the Wednesday -- for the 9 March, and that any other matters then follow -- that 10 might be filed, follow this matter so that we can 11 accommodate counsel. 12 13 MR. ALDER: Thank you. MR. MORRIS: Thank you, sir. 14 15 MR. BAYER: Thank you. CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Does that answer your 16 concern, Mr. Bernard? 17 MR. BERNARD: It does. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 18 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Okay. So Mr. Allen is typing 19 slower than he thought he would. Is that correct? 20 MR. DONALDSON: I'll call him. 21 22 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Let's take a short break. 23 (A break was taken from 2:33 p.m. to 2:59 p.m.) CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Let's go back on the record. 24 25 Just so the parties are aware, the motion for

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partial dismissal, the Board is going to take that under advisement. And we will get an answer to that as soon as we can. But we're not going to be able to do that today.

So Mr. Allen, are you the operative party here?

MR. ALLEN: I fear that I am. There's just been one tiny issue that's been pointed out to me, that I may wish to step to the next table and confer.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Please do.

(A discussion was held off the record.)

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Okay. So Mr. Allen, you have a stipulation that the parties have agreed to?

MR. ALLEN: Yes. Upon stipulation, the parties wish to read a joint motion for a discovery order into the record.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Okay.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$ ALLEN: And we would ask the Board to consider our motion.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Yes, please do that.

MR. ALLEN: "Stipulation. Parties agree to jointly move the Board for an order providing for discovery in this matter on the following terms:

"Site inspection. Alton will provide petitioners with access to all of the permit and adjacent areas where they have control or right of entry, effective immediately, on the following terms and

conditions:

- "1. Participants and purposes of the site visit for a period of four days are as set forth in Petitioner's Second Motion for a Site Visit previously filed with the Board;
- "2. Petitioners will be accompanied at all times on site by an escort provided by Alton and by the Division;
- "3. The escort will create a digital or videotape recording of the activities on site at Alton's expense. The recording is to be made without sound unless agreed otherwise;
- "4. All parties agree that access to the site is entirely at their own risk;
- "5. Petitioner will provide Alton with a split of any samples collected during the visit;
- "6. To facilitate efficient use of time on site, petitioners' and Alton's experts will meet in advance, accompanied by counsel, to identify appropriate times for obtaining the necessary site information;
- "7. Parties acknowledge that petitioners are willing to conduct their site visit before snow melt has occurred, but have reservations that all of their objectives can be accomplished under available site conditions. Petitioners therefore expressly reserve the

right to request a follow-up visit, either informally or through a Board Order for Discovery;

"8. The Division will assist in obtaining access to areas material to the AVF determination;

"9. Parties will endeavor to perform the site visit between February 16 and March 5.

New heading, "Production of Documents."

- "1. Alton and the Division will provide, as soon as possible but in any event prior to the site visit, field notes, laboratory reports, and logs of geological and hydrological investigations by either party or their consultants for inspection by petitioners.
- "2. The Division will produce a compact electronic data disk containing the permit application and other documents related to the permit approval to be current as of the date the permit was approved."

New heading, "Depositions."

"Pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6), the parties will take depositions as follows:

"1. Alton and the Division shall make witnesses available for deposition upon oral examination during the period from February 16 through March 5, 2010, upon topics to be agreed upon by the parties. Scope of examination to include materials submitted to the Division, background as necessary, and the review process

by the Division.

"2. Petitioners shall make witnesses available for deposition upon oral examination upon topics to be agreed by the parties between March 8 and March 19, 2010. Scope of examination to be basis of contentions by petitioners and foundations for the request for relief.

"Interrogatories are not allowed. Requests for Admission are not allowed unless otherwise agreed and ordered by the Board.

"Petitioners will serve their hearing witness list on respondents on or before March 5, 2010.

"Respondents will serve their initial hearing witness list on petitioners on or before February 10, 2010.

"Exhibits will be exchanged electronically on or before April 7, 2010. At that time, parties will identify all scientific or technical references or treatises upon which they will rely at hearing."

And then the Order we would propose that the Board enter is as follows:

"The Board, upon motion of the parties and for good cause appearing, hereby enters its order providing for discovery in this matter upon the terms and conditions set forth in the parties' oral stipulation.

Respondent Alton will prepare a written order for the

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Chairman's signature after enforcement by counsel for petitioners and the Division."

 $\,$ And that is our stipulation and the motion that we present to the Board.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Okay. And all the parties have agreed to this stipulation?

MR. ALDER: We have.

MR. MORRIS: Petitioners have agreed.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: So what's the pleasure of the Board? Mr. Jensen.

MR. JENSEN: I see your proposed order at the end. But I would like to request that your order recite all the things that's in your stipulation. And you've got a reference in the stipulation to something about in the petitioner's second motion.

MR. BAYER: Do you want us to incorporate that?

MR. JENSEN: I'd like to see that within the four corners you can read and know what the order is, if that would be acceptable with all of you.

MR. BAYER: I think we can accommodate the Board on that easily.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Do you want to make that in the form of a motion?

MR. JENSEN: It's in the record, but that is my motion that the stipulation be reduced in its entirety,

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and any references in the stipulation to other pleadings be incorporated so that the Order, as prepared and approved by counsel, contains everything, and that you don't have to look anywhere else. And based on that, then I would move that the stipulation be approved.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Is there a second?

MR. QUIGLEY: Second it.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Any discussion?

All those this favor say aye.

BOARD MEMBERS: Aye.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Is anyone opposed? Good.

MR. BAYER: Thank you very much. We hammered that one out through quite a lot of deliberations this morning to try to facilitate it and move this along so that you folks wouldn't have to put up with any arguments on discovery.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: We appreciate the efforts of all the parties in consolidating things and coming to agreements.

MR. QUIGLEY: Absolutely.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Is there anything else we need to do, then?

Before we go off the record, is there anyone present would who would like to address the Board on any other matters? Seeing none --

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MR. JENSEN: Mr. Chairman, if the Board -because we're looking at some dates to see if we can
accommodate some dates -- I'm a little bit concerned. If
all the Board can reach a couple of dates, I'm concerned
about Mr. Morris' concern of whether you can get on and
do your site visit or not. Because we're -- between all
the people here on the Board, we're going to go way out
of our way to try and pick a couple of dates in April to
accommodate the hearing. And I'm not saying that we
couldn't change that, but it would be somewhat of an
imposition after we've scheduled the dates, then, to have
to move that because of not being able to get on the
property.

MR. MORRIS: We will try to get our expert to begin the site visit as soon as we get the documents that we need prior to the site visit. It shouldn't be very long, in other words, before we can tell the Board and ACD whether we think there's going to need to be a subsequent inspection. And our concern is that the Board not set anything in stone until we at least have that opportunity and can bring the question of a second site visit before the Board without things having already been set in stone. I think we can do that very quickly.

MR. GILL: Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Yes, Mr. Gill.

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MR. GILL: Just a follow up to Mr. Jensen, and that is on the April dates, would it be worthwhile to sort of put a placeholder on a couple of days in April for -- just so that we don't fill them up? And I'm proposing that -- the April hearing is on a Wednesday. I'm available -- and I think a lot of others are -- on the adjacent Thursday and Friday.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: We discussed that a little bit. We're going to ask the Division to find out, if we did set aside a Friday, would it be possible for us to use the building and have the necessary staff people here.

So if you guys could find that out and let us know, we'd appreciate that.

But just the dates that, at this point in time, seem like they may be agreeable to all Board members would be those two days after the April hearing. I believe that would be April 29 and 30. But that's not firmed up.

MR. GILL: Well, I'm just saying as a placeholder.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Yes.

MR. GILL: Not as a firm day.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Yes, very good.

MR. GILL: So is it worthwhile to put something

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there, or is your general feeling of the Board members that that may not work?

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: I think the general feeling is, as of right now, it looks like those may be acceptable. And if I understand the plans for the site visit, by March 5 you will probably know whether or not you were able to accomplish the site visit and accomplish all the things that you wanted to do. Is that correct?

MR. MORRIS: That's correct. And I would hope, because that's the end of the window --

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Right.

MR. MORRIS: -- that we could get things together and let the Board know much earlier than that -- let ACD and all parties know.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: But March 5, at the outside, you will know whether or not that site visit was able to be performed?

MR. MORRIS: Yes.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Okay.

And yes, Mike.

MR. JOHNSON: Well, I was just going to say, before you conclude you might want to just orally continue this until March, if that sounds like the next regularly scheduled date the parties will need from the Board, so it doesn't have to be re-noticed.

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CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Okay. So this matter will be continued to the March 24, 2010, hearing. And as I said a little bit earlier, we are taking the motion for partial dismissal under advisement, and we will have an answer on that as soon as we can.

Is that all we need to do, then? Okay. Thank you very much. And we stand adjourned.

(The proceedings concluded at 3:13 p.m.)